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ABSTRACT
Is the United States at risk of democratic backsliding?  And would the Constitution prevent such decay? 
To many, the 2016 election campaign and the conduct of newly installed President Donald Trump 
may be the immediate catalyst for these questions.  But structural changes to the socioeconomic 
environment and geopolitical shifts are what make the question a truly pressing one.  Eschewing a focus 
on current events, this Article develops a taxonomy of different threats of democratic backsliding, 
the mechanisms whereby they unfold, and the comparative risk of each threat in the contemporary 
moment.  By drawing on comparative law and politics experience, we demonstrate that there are 
two modal paths of democratic decay.  We call these authoritarian reversion and constitutional 
retrogression.  A reversion is a rapid and near-complete collapse of democratic institutions. 
Retrogression is a more subtle, incremental erosion to three institutional predicates of democracy 
occurring simultaneously: competitive elections; rights of political speech and association; and the 
administrative and adjudicative rule of law.  We show that over the past quarter-century, the risk of 
reversion in democracies around the world has declined, whereas the risk of retrogression has spiked. 
The United States is neither exceptional nor immune from these changes.  We evaluate the danger of 
retrogression as clear and present here (and elsewhere), whereas we think reversion is much less likely. 
We further demonstrate that the constitutional safeguards against retrogression are weak.  The near-
term prospects of constitutional liberal democracy hence depend less on our institutions than on the 
qualities of political leadership, popular resistance, and the quiddities of partisan coalitional politics.
AUTHOR
Professors of Law, University of Chicago Law School.  Our thanks to Bojan Bugarič, Brian 
Feinstein, David Fontana, Andrew Friedman, Brandon Garrett, Jason Gluck, Ryan Goodman, 
Richard Helmholz, Todd Henderson, Andy Hessick, William Hubbard, Samuel Issacharoff, 
Catherine Kim, Brian Leiter, Anup Malani, William Marshall, Richard McAdams, Jennifer 
Nou, Richard Pildes, Eric Posner, Gerald Rosenberg, Mike Seidman, and participants in 
workshops at the University of Chicago Law School, Princeton University, Yale University, and 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, for helpful comments.  Work on this Article 
was supported by the Frank J. Cicero, Jr., Fund.  We are very grateful to Quemars Ahmed 
and other student editors with the journal for their diligent work.  Our errors are our own.
79
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 80
I. Constitutional Liberal Democracy and Its Enemies .............................................................. 86
A. The Baseline of Constitutional Liberal Democracy ..................................................................... 86
B. Two Threats to Constitutional Liberal Democracy ...................................................................... 92
1. Authoritarian Reversion ......................................................................................................... 92
2. Constitutional Retrogression ................................................................................................. 94
II. America in the Shadow of Authoritarian Reversion ............................................................. 99
A. When Do Democracies Collapse Into Authoritarianism? ........................................................ 100
B. The Risk of Authoritarian Reversion in the United States ........................................................ 105
1. Prior Estimates of Authoritarian Reversion Risk ............................................................. 105
2. Reconsidering the Risk of Authoritarian Reversion in a Comparative 
  and Historical Light ............................................................................................................... 108
3. Constitutional Barriers and Incitements to Authoritarian Reversions ......................... 110
4. Summary ................................................................................................................................. 117
III. The Emerging Threat of Constitutional Retrogression ..................................................... 117
A. The Global Diffusion of Constitutional Retrogression .............................................................. 118
B. Pathways of Constitutional Retrogression ................................................................................... 123
1. Formal Constitutional Amendment ................................................................................... 124
2. Th e Elimination of Institutional Checks ............................................................................ 125
3. Centralizing and Politicizing Executive Power ................................................................. 127
4. Shrinking the Public Sphere ................................................................................................. 130
5. Th e Elimination of Political Competition .......................................................................... 136
6. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 137
C. Bringing Constitutional Retrogression Home............................................................................. 143
1. Constitutional Amendment ................................................................................................. 143
2. Th e Elimination of Institutional Checks ............................................................................ 144
3. Centralizing and Politicizing Executive Power ................................................................. 148
4. Shrinking the Public Sphere ................................................................................................. 153
5. Th e Elimination of Political Competition .......................................................................... 157
6. Federalism ............................................................................................................................... 160
7. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 162
IV. Is American Constitutional Democracy Exceptional? ........................................................ 162
A. Evaluating the Risks ......................................................................................................................... 163
B. Navigating Constitutional Retrogression ..................................................................................... 166
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................... 168
80 65 UCLA L. REV. 78 (2018) 
	
INTRODUCTION 
To many observers, the 2016 election cycle and the presidency of Donald 
Trump that ensued were unique and noteworthy in the way that hitherto 
stable norms of American liberal democracy under the rule of law suddenly 
seemed fragile and contested.1  But concerns about the health of our democracy 
are hardly new to the 2016 campaign.2  Indeed, they stretch back to the very 
beginning of the republic.3  But is today different?  And if there are indeed 
pressures toward democratic decay, what in the text of the Constitution or its 
attendant jurisprudence would operate as frictions on that process?  Would the 
basic law matter if or when democratic practice came under severe threat, or 
does democratic stability depend on the quiddities of particular leaders and 
their electoral coalitions?  It is not possible to evaluate the implications of 
current events without a larger lens that picks out in an objective and 
systematic fashion how threats to democratic stability emerge and become 
entrenched.  Conversely, focusing on the immediate context of the Trump 
presidency tends to be polarizing in ways that undermine, rather than 
facilitate, effective analysis and discussion. 
This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the relationship 
between democratic backsliding and U.S. constitutional law.  It aims to 
provide a clear analytic framework for evaluating both the risks and 
institutional resources within U.S. constitutional law.  Such a systematic 
examination of the constitutional predicates of democratic stability is 
necessary, we think, given a trio of extrinsic, structural forces that place liberal 
democracy in the United States today under increasing strain.  All of these 
forces, moreover, operate independently of the particularities of today’s 
polarized partisan politics. 
First, it has long been thought that liberal democratic rule within the rule 
of law requires “strong liberal civil societies” committed to that form of 
governance.4  But over the past three decades, the proportion of U.S. citizens 
  
1. For an analysis of relevant evidence, see infra text accompanying notes 381–382. 
2. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Opinion, Our Democracy Is at Stake, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/02/opinion/friedman-our-democracy-is-at-
stake.html (“What is at stake in this government shutdown forced by a radical Tea Party 
minority is nothing less than the principle upon which our democracy is based: majority 
rule.”). 
3. For a collection of sources on this point, see Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Federalist and the Lessons 
of Rome, 75 MISS. L.J. 431, 492 (2006). 
4. James Dawson & Seán Hanley, What’s Wrong With East-Central Europe?  The 
Fading Mirage of the “Liberal Consensus”, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2016, at 20, 31; see 
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who say they believe it would be a “good” or a “very good” thing for the “army 
to rule” has spiked from one in sixteen to one in six.5  Among a cohort of “rich 
young Americans” the proportion of those who look favorably on military rule 
is more than one in three.6  Meanwhile, there is some evidence of rising 
constitutional ignorance among the very same generation.7  The popular 
support that works as democracy’s rebar, that is, may be eroding with 
alarming speed. 
Second, it is well established that economic inequality is associated with 
increasing acceptance of authoritarian rule.8  Studies of democratic collapse 
show that inequality tends to be “significantly higher in democracies that 
eventually underwent a reversal.”9  This bodes ill for the United States.  
Income shares of the top and bottom quintile diverged sharply between 1970 
and 2000.  The former saw their incomes rise 61.6 percent and the latter a 
measly 10.3 percent.10  The structural forces producing wage stagnation 
across much of the income spectrum, moreover, are entrenched beyond 
speedy repair,11 even without accounting for the distinctive polarization and 
paralysis of U.S. national politics.  Economic trend lines thus disfavor 
democratic perseverance in the near and medium term, quite apart from any 
role that economic grievances may have played in this election. 
  
also Francis Fukuyama, The Future of History: Can Liberal Democracy Survive the 
Decline of the Middle Class?, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 53.  The role of civil 
society in democratic collapse is, however, complex.  Cf. Sheri Berman, Civil 
Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic, 49 WORLD POL. 401, 408 (1997) 
(arguing that the strong Weimar civil society “served not to strengthen democracy 
but to weaken it,” by providing vehicles for Nazi mobilization). 
5. Roberto Stefan Foa & Yascha Mounk, The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic 
Disconnect, J. DEMOCRACY, July 2016, at 5, 12. 
6. Id. at 13. 
7. Tom Gerald Daly, Constitutional Ignorance and Democratic Decay: Breaking the Feedback 
Loop, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG: I·CONNECT (Nov. 17, 2016), 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/11/constitutional-ignorance-and-democratic-decay-
breaking-the-feedback-loop [https://perma.cc/B9X7-Y482]; see also infra note 385. 
8. Adam Przeworski, The Poor and the Viability of Democracy, in POVERTY, 
PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 129 (Anirudh Krishna ed., 
2008). 
9. Ethan B. Kapstein & Nathan Converse, Poverty, Inequality, and Democracy: Why 
Democracies Fail, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 2008, at 57, 61. 
10. ASPA Task Force, American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 651, 
652–53 (2004); see also LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 31–32 (2d ed. 2016) (summarizing changing income distributions). 
11. See Robert J. Gordon, Is U.S. Economic Growth Over?  Faltering Innovation Confronts the Six 
Headwinds 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18315, 2012) (listing 
“headwinds” that will hinder the continuation of rapid growth). 
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Finally, developments in governance in other parts of the world do not 
remain confined overseas. Instead, they can diffuse to shape and channel 
American practice.12  Scholars of democracy have of late expressed concern 
about an “absence of democratic progress,” “recession,” or “minor decline” in 
democracy’s march since the third wave of democratizations in the 1990s.13  
To some, democracy seems in full-blown “retreat.”14  Recent moves away 
from democratic practices toward a more authoritarian model in Eastern 
Europe suggest that such retreat inflects governance even in seemingly-stable 
democracies.15  Hungary, Poland, and other countries have embraced 
populist leaders who promise to end the gridlock that is democracy’s 
consequence.  In the United States, candidates in the 2016 election and their 
supporters repeatedly gestured toward events outside the country as evidence 
that their partisan side was in the ascendancy around the world.16 
Liberal democracy, in short, is subject today to a plural array of corroding 
crosscurrents arising both from specific partisan formations and actors, and 
from cultural, socioeconomic or geopolitical dynamics of a structural 
nature.17 
  
12. See, e.g., DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE 
AGE 231, 496–97 (1998) (charting influences of British and German social welfare 
policies in the United States); Beth A. Simmons & Zachary Elkins, The Globalization of 
Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy, 98 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 1971, 1972–74 (2004) (demonstrating diffusion of trade liberalization policy). 
13. Marc. F. Plattner, Is Democracy in Decline?, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2015, at 5, 7; accord 
Alexander Cooley, Authoritarianism Goes Global: Countering Democratic Norms, J. 
DEMOCRACY, July 2015, at 49 (focusing on authoritarian mimicry of democratic form); Larry 
Diamond, Facing Up to the Democratic Recession, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2015, at 141 
(describing a “recession” in democracy around the world); see also JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, 
DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT: THE REVOLT OF THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE WORLDWIDE DECLINE 
OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 9 (2013) (“By 2010, . . . nearly 53 of the 128 countries 
assessed by the index were categorized as ‘defective democracies.’”).  But see Steven Levitsky 
& Lucan Way, The Myth of Democratic Recession, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2015, at 45 (arguing 
that this perceived trend away from democracy is illusory). 
14. KURLANTZICK, supra note 13, at 6–10. 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 208–215, 227–232. 
16. See, e.g., Ian Buruma, The End of the Anglo-American Order, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/magazine/the-end-of-the-anglo-american-order.html 
(documenting transatlantic invocations of solidarity of this sort). 
17. The distinction between “agent-based or agentic theories” and “structural theories” of 
democratic rollback organizes much of the political science literature on the topic of 
democratic failures.  ELLEN LUST & DAVID WALDNER, U.S. AGENCY INT’L DEV., UNWELCOME 
CHANGE: UNDERSTANDING, EVALUATING, AND EXTENDING THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIC 
BACKSLIDING 8–9 (2015).  Our aim here is not to adjudicate between those two 
approaches, but to ask how legal institutions influence the pace of democratic 
retrogression under both agentic and structural strains.  In any case, we think that the 
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Against these destructive currents stands the U.S. Constitution.  It is 
conventional wisdom that the checks and balances of the federal government,18 a 
robust civil society and media, as well as individual rights, such as the First 
Amendment,19 will work as effective bulwarks against democratic backsliding.  
Yet such an analysis is hindered by the absence of any clear-eyed comparative 
analysis of how constitutional legal institutions and rules in practice either 
hinder or enable drift away from liberal democratic norms. 
This Article reconstructs the role of constitutional institutions and 
doctrines in protecting democratic practice in light of new empirical and 
theoretical learning about the mechanisms of democratic failures of various 
sorts.  That inquiry at the threshold requires a new taxonomy of threats to 
liberal democratic practice under the Constitution.20  We propose a distinction 
between two threats, each with its own distinct mechanisms and end-states.  
We call these authoritarian reversion and constitutional retrogression.  We 
define (and defend) this terminology in Part I, but a brief explanation may be 
helpful here. 
“Authoritarian reversion” is a wholesale, rapid collapse into 
authoritarianism.  Think of a coup or the sudden declaration of a state of 
emergency.  But not all backsliding is either sudden or complete.  The 
existence of more subtle forms of institutional erosion requires a discrete 
concept.  We deploy the term “constitutional retrogression” to capture a more 
incremental (but ultimately substantial) decay in three basic predicates of 
democracy—competitive elections, liberal rights to speech and association, and 
the adjudicative and administrative rule of law necessary for democratic choice 
to thrive.  Retrogression demands simultaneous change in these democratic 
predicates.  In practice, it is distinct from reversion because it occurs more 
slowly through an accumulation of piecemeal changes, each perhaps 
  
structural forces enumerated in the text are likely causes of antidemocratic and populist 
formations in politics. 
18. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) (describing the separation of 
powers as a “security against tyranny—the accumulation of excessive authority in a single 
Branch”). 
19. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1102 
(2016) (“[A] broad consensus has emerged over the past half-century regarding the 
fundamental reason why the Constitution protects free speech: to advance democratic self-
governance.”). 
20. Earlier treatments of democratic breakdown include BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND 
FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010), and Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, 
Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789 (2010).  We 
develop, however, a different taxonomy, as well as different mechanisms, from these careful 
and insightful treatments. 
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innocuous or even justified in isolation.  It is also, however, analytically 
distinct from other species of constitutional changes, such as the rise of a 
powerful executive, the growth or decay of national regulatory power as against 
subnational units, or the diffusion of new constitutional rights.  These latter 
developments are not typically characterized by simultaneous degradation in 
rights, electoral competition, and the rule of law. 
We demonstrate that legal scholarship, and some popular discourse after 
the election, has focused on the risk of authoritarian reversion, but that the 
distinct threat of constitutional retrogression may in fact pose a more pressing 
and consequential challenge.  This has normative implications insofar as each 
threat is associated with a distinct set of constitutional design decisions, and 
each demands a different set of constitutional strategies to address. 
With this in mind, we analyze the role of domestic legal and political 
institutions in managing the threat of constitutional retrogression.  Here, we 
draw upon a wealth of political science and comparative constitutional 
scholarship to demonstrate that the usual confidence in entrenched domestic 
constitutional rules and institutions in the United States may well be 
misguided.21  Whether one focuses upon longstanding and well-entrenched 
legal rules and institutions, or more locally on recent doctrinal developments, 
there is ample cause for concern that the Constitution provides at best a 
fragile barrier against constitutional retrogression.  Relevant aspects of 
constitutional law, we suggest, pursue one of two familiar strategies: using the 
structure of government to generate internal institutional diversity (e.g., by 
creating separate branches, or insulating the states as separate sovereigns), 
and endowing individual rights (e.g., to privacy, speech, or equality) that shield 
the social ecosystem necessary for the persistence of democratic contestation.  
Contrary to prevailing wisdom, we suggest that not all structural principles or 
individual rights found in our Constitution, at least as interpreted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court today, stabilize democracy.  Some perversely are likely to 
accelerate destabilization.  But rights and structure do not exhaust the options 
for constitutional design.  Drawing attention to the fact that constitutions are a 
  
21. We focus on established constitutional rules and institutions to avoid concerns about 
endogeneity within our analysis.  That is, if antidemocratic forces generated new 
constitutional rules that were destabilizing, then it would be misleading to ascribe the 
resulting effects on political outcomes to the Constitution (as opposed to the 
antidemocratic forces that have employed the Constitution to a certain end).  To avoid 
this confusion, we focus on constitutional institutions and rules that predate the 
current political conjuncture. 
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form of inevitably incomplete contract,22 we posit that there are also gaps that 
can be exploited to unravel a democratic equilibrium. 
Our analysis suggests that when local partisan forces or an exogenous 
constellation of socioeconomic and transnational forces threaten that political 
disposition, the Constitution as currently construed provides only feeble 
shelter.  Democratic stability hence depends on the preferences of particular 
leaders and the dynamics of their political coalitions.  Under the right political 
conditions, therefore, constitutional retrogression is a clear and present risk to 
American constitutional liberal democracy. 
It will be a surprise to no reader that the analysis we undertake in this 
Article was catalyzed by our perception of the 2016 election and its 
consequences.  We have nevertheless deliberately calibrated our analysis in 
general terms, and tried, to the extent we think feasible, to avoid a focus on 
current events.   
There are a number of reasons for this.  First, current events are moving 
fast.  To anchor our analysis in the particular actions or policies adopted by 
President Trump, to the litigation that has been generated, or to the 
investigations underway as of early-2018 would risk giving a hostage to 
fortune.  Second, we think that a focus on current events injects a needlessly 
polarizing element into the analysis.  We think that the analytic points we 
make about constitutional design in this Article are general in nature, and do 
not wish to frame them in partisan terms.  Finally, and most importantly, we 
think that the problem of democratic decline is general in nature, and not 
linked to a particular presidency.  Therefore, it would be affirmatively 
misleading for us to suggest otherwise. 
Our argument has four steps.  Part I introduces and clarifies our central 
concepts.  Part II focuses on the threat of authoritarian reversion, suggesting 
it most often occurs through military coups or the misuse of emergency 
powers.  We suggest that authoritarian reversion does not present pressing 
concern today.  Part III focuses on the more-likely threat of constitutional 
retrogression.  Our analytic strategy is to deploy comparative constitutional 
experience to illuminate vectors whereby such retrogression occurs, and then 
to consider how American constitutional institutions and rules respond.  
Although the Constitution certainly contains some useful institutional 
  
22. See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in Constitutional 
Design, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 636 (2011) (modeling constitutional amendment rules as a 
response to an incomplete contracting problem); Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 
U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 1191–22 (2014) (using a contracting metaphor to understand the 
dynamics of constitutional amendment). 
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resources, we demonstrate that to a surprising degree, longstanding 
institutions and rules are either irrelevant to the particular threat, or exacerbate 
it.  Part IV concludes by reflecting on lessons for legal scholars, for 
constitutional law as a discipline, and for the citizenry at large. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND ITS ENEMIES 
Our argument relies upon a set of threshold conceptual premises, set out 
in this Part.  These are, first, a definition of “democracy,” the institutional 
characteristic that is at risk of reversal, and second, a taxonomy of forms of 
democratic backsliding.  Drawing upon an extensive literature in political 
science, we delineate two different forms of institutional decay. 
A. The Baseline of Constitutional Liberal Democracy 
Much of the relevant political science literature on democratic reversal 
focuses on a simple concept of democracy identified closely with the fact 
of elections.23  But the literature on democracy also recognizes that the 
concept is a multifaceted one that can be described with various levels of 
thickness.24  Our analysis requires a thicker conception.  We call this 
constitutional liberal democracy.  Our argument must begin by explaining 
and justifying our choice. 
Democracy is frequently boiled down to the seemingly-simple 
foundational requirement of competitive elections.  This in turn entails that 
polls’ results are ex ante uncertain, irreversible, and ex post repeatable.25  We 
think these basic elements of competitive elections cannot be meaningfully 
untangled from a thick set of institutional and legal predicates.26  Elections 
  
23. See, e.g., LUST & WALDNER, supra note 17, at 2 (“[M]inimalists focus exclusively on 
elections . . . .”); Plattner, supra note 13, at 5–7. 
24. Famously, Joseph Schumpeter described it as “that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”  JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269 (1942); see also ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., 
DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN THE 
WORLD, 1950–1990, at 15 (2000); Michael Coppedge et al., Conceptualizing and 
Measuring Democracy: A New Approach, 9 PERSPS. ON POL. 247 (2011). 
25. See Adam Przeworski et al., What Makes Democracies Endure?, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1996, 
at 39, 50–51. 
26. For criticisms of the minimalist definition, see Guillermo O’Donnell, Illusions About 
Consolidation, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1996, at 34, 38, which criticizes the minimalist view on 
the basis that competitive elections do not of themselves act as a guarantee of inclusion of the 
public voice in politics and argues for a “realistic” definition of democracy.  For more robust 
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with only one feasible winner, either because only one entity competes, or 
because only one entity will be allowed to exercise power, are insufficient.  
Elections that happen once, never to be repeated, do not a democracy make.27  
For genuine electoral competition to be sustained, therefore, something more 
than a bare minimum of legal and institutional arrangements is necessary.28  In 
addition, there is a need for the civil and political rights employed in the 
democratic process,29 the availability of neutral electoral machinery, and the 
stability, predictability, and publicity of a legal regime usually captured in 
the term “rule of law.”30 
To implement this more robust view of democracy, our analysis focuses 
on a triad of system-level properties of national institutions as a whole that, in 
our view, intertwine and interact closely.  When present together, these three 
traits warrant the label of constitutional liberal democracy.  These traits are: 
(1) a democratic electoral system, most importantly periodic free-and-fair 
elections in which a losing side cedes power; (2) the liberal rights to speech and 
association that are closely linked to democracy in practice;31 and (3) the 
stability, predictability, and integrity of law and legal institutions—the rule of 
law—functionally necessary to allow democratic engagement without fear or 
coercion.  These three institutional predicates of democracy are necessary to 
the maintenance of a reasonable level of democratic responsiveness and 
unbiased elections.  In the absence of all three institutional predicates, we 
would anticipate levels of democratic responsiveness to falter.32 
  
specifications of democracy, see, for example, LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: 
TOWARD CONSOLIDATION 10–12 (1999), which includes vertical and horizontal 
accountability in a definition of democracy. 
27. See Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Sec’y of State for Near E. & S. Asian Affairs, Address at 
the Meridian House International: The U.S. and the Middle East in a Changing World (June 
2, 1992), http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/vol%2014_4/djerejian.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A6LB-R947] (coining the expression “one man, one vote, one time”). 
28. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 266–67 (1991) (articulating now famous “two-turnover” test for democratic 
consolidation); ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 10 (Jon Elster & Michael S. 
McPherson eds., 1991) (“Democracy is a system in which parties lose elections.”). 
29. For examples of maximalist (or “realist”) views of democracy on rights grounds, see ROBERT 
A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 221 (1989), and O’Donnell, supra note 26, at 38. 
30. Marc F. Plattner, From Liberalism to Liberal Democracy, J. DEMOCRACY, July 1999, at 121, 
121–23. 
31. Id. (arguing for a close relation between liberal rights and democratic practice); see DAHL, 
supra note 29, at 221. 
32. Our focus is hence on the institutional predicates of democratic responsiveness, not the 
measurement of democratic responsiveness per se.  This helps inform our analysis of 
backsliding-related mechanisms in Parts II and III.  One might instead focus directly 
on unbiased democratic responsiveness as a metric of constitutional liberal democracy.  
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On the first element, we follow the economist Joseph Schumpeter’s 
dictum that meaningful elections with a genuine possibility of alteration in 
power are necessary to democracy.33  As political scientist Adam Przeworski 
pithily puts it, democracy is “a system in which parties lose elections.”34  Our 
conception of liberal rights focuses solely on the core “first generation” rights 
of speech (including press), assembly, and association, which directly 
facilitate democratic deliberation and contestation.35  And we draw our 
conception of the rule of law from Lon Fuller, who focuses on a set of 
procedural requirements without including substantive concepts like rights 
or morality.36 
These three elements—elections, speech and association rights, and the 
rule of law—are conceptually separate; they do not always run together.  There 
are historical and contemporary instances of countries that have robust 
electoral democracies, even while the rule of law is weak and liberal rights lack 
social support.37  Other countries have the elements of “thin” rule of law and 
civil liberties without genuine political competition.38  And constitutionalism 
  
But there remains sharp debate about the appropriate measure of democratic 
responsiveness among political scientists.  See Jeff Manza & Fay Lomax Cook, A 
Democratic Polity?  Three Views of Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion in the United 
States, 30 AM. POL. RES. 630, 634–39 (2002) (cataloguing various metrics of 
responsiveness); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. 283, 300–02 (2014) (criticizing the conceptualization of responsiveness measures).  
We take no position on the “correct” responsiveness measure, although we think a 
constitutional liberal democracy as we define it should generally score well on most, if 
not all, such measures. 
33. SCHUMPETER, supra note 24. 
34. PRZEWORSKI, supra note 28, at 10; see Adam Przeworski, Minimalist Conception of 
Democracy: A Defense, in DEMOCRACY’S VALUE 23 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón 
eds., 1999); see also CARLOS BOIX, DEMOCRACY AND REDISTRIBUTION 66 (2003) (defining 
democracy as a system in which: (1) the legislature is elected in free, multiparty elections; (2) 
the executive is directly or indirectly elected in popular elections and is responsible either 
directly to voters or to a democratic legislature; (3) suffrage extends to at least 50 percent of 
adult men). 
35. DANIEL J. WHELAN, INDIVISIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY 210 (2016) (describing 
generations). 
36. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–94 (rev. ed. 1969).  We follow Joseph Raz’s view 
that the rule of law is not the same as “the rule of the good law,” and has no necessary 
relation to equality of justice.  JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 211, 214 (2d ed. 2009). 
37. See, e.g., DONALD HOROWITZ, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA 234–
35 (2013) (describing the rule of law deficit in Indonesia); Edward Aspinall, The Surprising 
Democratic Behemoth: Indonesia in Comparative Asian Perspective, 74 J. ASIAN STUD. 889 
(2015) (describing Indonesia as an inclusive democracy with weak rule of law). 
38. See, e.g., JOTHIE RAJAH, AUTHORITARIAN RULE OF LAW: LEGISLATION, DISCOURSE, AND 
LEGITIMACY IN SINGAPORE 40 (2012) (discussing authoritarian use of rule-of law-forms). 
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is feasible in the absence of either liberal entitlements or democratic 
rotation.39 
But in the American context, each of these institutional elements 
reinforces the other.  They are entangled in plural, mutually-reinforcing ways 
that have seemed to generate a stable democratic equilibrium for now.  
Hence, some elements of the rule of law and rights are surely necessary to 
sustain even the thin Schumpeterian concept of democracy.  Meaningful 
elections require a bureaucratic machinery capable of applying rules in a 
neutral and consistent fashion over an extended territory.40  Further, election 
rules must be clearly announced to the public.  There must be officials to 
organize and staff polls, certify ballot structure, and establish counting 
facilities.  There must be adjudicative institutions to resolve disputes, both 
large and small, about the conduct of the election. 
Beyond sound administration, constitutional rights to speech and 
association facilitate political competition.  One cannot have meaningful 
political competition without the relatively free ability to organize and offer 
policy proposals, criticize leaders, and secure freedom from official 
intimidation.41  In this sense, electoral democracy is deeply intertwined with 
  
39. See Zachary Elkins et al., The Content of Authoritarian Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONS IN 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 141 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser eds., 2014) (identifying 
common characteristics of authoritarian constitutions); Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian 
Constitutionalism, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 391, 396 (2015) (distinguishing absolutist, 
authoritarian, and liberal constitutionalism). 
40. Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1458 (2007) (flagging 
the emergence of an administrative law of democracy in some national contexts).  
Electoral administration in the United States, however, is fragmented and institutionally 
weak because of “path-dependent state primacy over electoral regulation, the lack of 
existing federal infrastructure to monitor elections nationally, as well as the weak political 
will to establish robust federal electoral institutions.”  Jennifer Nou, Sub-Regulating 
Elections, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 137; see also Daniel P. Tokaji, The Birth and Rebirth of 
Election Administration, 6 ELECTION L.J. 118, 122–23 (2007) (reviewing ROY G. SALTMAN, 
THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY: IN QUEST OF INTEGRITY AND PUBLIC 
CONFIDENCE (2006)). 
41. The Fourth Amendment, for example, was inspired by concerns about the use of state 
power to target and harass dissenting politicians—a function at some remove from its 
modal current operation as a source of authority for a federal law of policing.  See 
William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 
396–403 (1995).  Parliamentary immunity has a similar history, and was designed to 
shield political discourse from overweening prosecutions in medieval England.  See 
PARLIAMENTARIANS AT LAW: SELECT LEGAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE LONG FIFTEENTH 
CENTURY RELATING TO PARLIAMENT 4–8 (Hannes Kleineke ed., 2008).  See generally 
Daniel Chirot, The Long Struggle: Enlightenment, Counter-Enlightenment, and the 
Importance of Ideas in Democratization, 74 J. ASIAN STUD. 863, 867 (2015) (“Ultimately 
it remains true that institutions, even strong ones, are weak in the face of crisis if there 
is not a core belief in the idea of individual freedom to think and choose.”). 
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the Bill of Rights.42  Constitutional liberal democracy also typically rests on a 
delicate interplay between diverse state and civil-society institutions, which 
themselves depend on the enforcement of liberal rights.43  By reducing the 
stakes of government, moreover, a zone of liberal rights also facilitates 
political competition.44  The prospect of future alternation of political power, 
in turn, incentivizes investment in constitutional rules and enforcement.45  
This virtuous circle suggests that there can be a robust equilibrium (i.e., 
constitutional liberal democracy) that emerges as a system-level consequence 
of the interaction between these different elements.46 
It is hard to quantify such a system-level property.  Nor does the 
Constitution itself create a ready gauge of its success.47  We think of it as 
an ideal type, never perfectly achieved in practice, but useful for 
orientating our evaluation.48  So conceived, it would be foolish to claim 
that the ideal has been perfectly realized in the United States.  Long 
periods of our history have been characterized by narrowing franchise 
restrictions, malapportionment, and suppression of constitutional 
rights, along with the existence of subnational authoritarianism in parts 
of the country.49  Even current electoral practice is characterized by 
  
42. Cf. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN 
REPUBLIC 116 (2010) (speculating whether founders were correct in arguing for a bill of 
rights and separation of powers). 
43. But see Berman, supra note 4, at 408 (noting the potentially ambivalent role of civil society). 
44. See Rui J.P. de Figueiredo Jr. & Barry R. Weingast, The Rationality of Fear: Political 
Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict, in CIVIL WARS, INSECURITY, AND INTERVENTION 261 
(Barbara F. Walter & Jack Snyder eds., 1999). 
45. For accounts of constitutional creation that rest on self-interested motivations, see 
generally TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003), and Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of 
Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245 (1997). 
46. See ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM EFFECTS: COMPLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE 6 
(1997) (discussing system-level effects); Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 
2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 
(2009) (“A system effect arises when the properties of an aggregate differ from the 
properties of its members, taken one by one.”); see also Caryn Devins et al., Against 
Design, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 609 (2015) (arguing that a constitution is not a designed 
system). 
47. Recent historical work that stresses the Constitution’s elitist slant includes TERRY 
BOUTON, TAMING DEMOCRACY: “THE PEOPLE,” THE FOUNDERS, AND THE TROUBLED 
ENDING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2007), and WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY 
AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 14–16 (2007). 
48. See I MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 20–21 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich 
eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1922). 
49. See EDWARD L. GIBSON, BOUNDARY CONTROL: SUBNATIONAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN 
FEDERAL DEMOCRACIES 35–71 (2012) (discussing subnational authoritarianism in the 
U.S. South prior to the second Reconstruction of the 1960s). 
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numerous exclusionary and suppressive practices.50  Rights-based 
liberalism is compromised by the systematic underenforcement of many 
individual rights.51  Politicians’ efforts to entrench themselves are 
endemic, not occasional.52  As a result, large gaps remain between the law 
on the ground and the law on the books.53 
Our definition of constitutional liberal democracy is consistent with 
a wide variety of institutional arrangements and policy preferences.  It 
encompasses both the robust administrative state of the post-New Deal 
federal government and the looser arrangement of “parties and courts” 
that preceded it.54  It can be accomplished through centralized or 
federalized governance, parliamentary or executive-led administrations.  
The mere fact of moving from a legislature-focused system to one 
organized around the president is ipso facto democratic derogation.  It is 
also consistent with a wide range of solutions for democracy’s so-called 
“boundary problem” of determining morally defensible limits to the 
democratic polity.55  Because all democracies fall short of the ideal of 
enfranchising all those whose interests are affected by decisionmaking,56 
the practice of democracy always involves a series of excisions and 
limitations on the franchise. 
Finally, we caution that our concept of a constitutional liberal 
democracy does not require “liberal” policy choices in the partisan 
political sense.  To the contrary, it is consistent with illiberal policies, such 
  
50. Consider, for example, the use of voter identification laws to suppress some 
elements of the electorate.  See Zoltan Hajnal et al., Voter Identification Laws and 
the Suppression of Minority Votes, 79 J. POL. 363 (2017) (presenting empirical 
evidence of effect of voter identification laws on partisan vote shares). 
51. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional 
Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2015) (“[T]he Court has developed a gatekeeping rule 
of fault for individualized constitutional remedies . . . .”). 
52. See Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE 
L.J. 400, 408–26 (2015) (documenting an extensive range of formal and informal 
entrenchment strategies). 
53. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
1, 16–23 (2010) (cataloging many more entrenched practices in state criminal courts 
that violate defendants’ constitutional rights). 
54. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 29 (1982). 
55. Frederick G. Whelan, Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem, in 
NOMOS XXV: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 13, 13–14 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. 
Chapman eds., 1983). 
56. See Robert E. Goodin, Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives, 35 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 40, 68 (2007) (recognizing the case for “giving virtually everyone 
everywhere a vote on virtually everything decided anywhere”). 
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as violations of racial, religious, and sexual-orientation autonomy, grave 
economic inequality or deprivation, or lack of social services provision.  
We instead assume a baseline that is democratic in a procedural sense, 
which is not a guarantee of good governance in any robust normative 
sense.  Our concept is thus not as thick as it could be.  But by including 
some elements of liberal rights and the rule of law, we seek to recognize 
that even the minimalist conception needs some institutional context. 
B. Two Threats to Constitutional Liberal Democracy 
The second foundational conceptual move we make is to decompose 
threats to the liberal constitutional order into two distinct types—each 
with its own mechanisms and implications.  Drawing on a deep political 
science literature concerning transitions to and from democracy, we 
distinguish between two risks to a seemingly consolidated constitutional 
liberal democracy such as the United States. We call these authoritarian 
reversion, the risk of a rapid, wholesale collapse into authoritarianism; and 
constitutional retrogression, the risk of large (albeit incremental) reversals 
simultaneously along rule-of-law, democratic, and liberal margins. 
1. Authoritarian Reversion 
Consider first the possibility that a democracy transitions completely and 
rapidly to authoritarianism, meaning some form of nondemocratic 
government.57  The term “reversion” is appropriate here because democracy, as a 
historical matter, is the exception rather than the rule.  Apart from a “very local 
Greek” phenomenon some 2,500 years ago, democracy “faded away almost 
everywhere” until about the last century.58  Even when democracies have been 
established, they are not always enduring and can return to autocracy.  As of 
2005, roughly 75 democracies had experienced such events.  We call these 
authoritarian reversions to signal the wholesale character of the institutional 
  
57. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, supra note 28, at 11–13 (using the term “authoritarian” to 
refer to any form of government that is nondemocratic); Milan Svolik, 
Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 153 
(2008) (analyzing the changing risk of authoritarian reversions in early-stage and 
late-stage democracies). 
58. JOHN DUNN, SETTING THE PEOPLE FREE: THE STORY OF DEMOCRACY 13–14 (2005).  
In contrast to the ebbing of democracy, the “Absolutist State” emerged in the West 
in roughly the sixteenth century as “a redeployed and recharged apparatus of 
feudal domination.”  PERRY ANDERSON, LINEAGES OF THE ABSOLUTIST STATE 18–19 
(3d ed. 2013) (emphasis omitted). 
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change.59  Such a wholesale movement away from democracy most often occurs 
through the mechanism of a military coup d’état (as in Thailand, Mali, and 
Mauritania)60 or via the use of emergency powers (most famously, in Weimar 
Germany).61 
Authoritarian reversions as we define them must be quick and 
complete, but they need not be permanent.  For instance, India’s drastic 
retreat from democratic government in the wake of Indira Gandhi’s use of 
emergency powers proved temporary because of her decision to hold new 
elections.62  Chile’s junta, operating in an environment in which legalism 
was powerful, held and lost a referendum that would have extended its 
rule for eight years, allowing a gradual return to democracy.63 
As the incidence of outright coups has declined in recent years,64 
aspirational authoritarians have turned instead to formal constitutional 
  
59. See Adam Przeworski, Democracy as an Equilibrium, 123 PUB. CHOICE 253, 263 
(2005).  In 2017, we updated Przeworski’s data to include Thailand 2006 (and 
2009); Bangladesh 2007; Mauritania 2008; Bhutan, Guinea-Bissau, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Nepal, and Pakistan, 2009 as instances of authoritarian reversion. 
60. See Jonathan M. Powell & Clayton L. Thyne, Global Instances of Coups From 1950 
to 2010: A New Dataset, 48 J. PEACE RES. 249, 249–52 (2011).  Coups occur in both 
democracies and nondemocracies, but are more common in the former.  See Curtis 
Bell, Coup d’État and Democracy, 49 COMP. POL. STUD. 1167, 1168 (2016). 
61. For an acute description of “Germany’s slippage into a kind of presidential dictatorship 
under Article 48” of the Weimar Constitution, see Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of 
Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 
1920s–1950s, 113 YALE L.J. 1341, 1369–71 (2004).  Emergency powers have been a 
mechanism of authoritarian reversions in other instances—see, e.g., Rodrigo Uprimny, The 
Constitutional Court and Control of Presidential Extraordinary Powers in Colombia, 10 
DEMOCRATIZATION 46, 51–52 (2003) (describing the use of emergency powers in 
Colombia)—and are often identified as the core threat to democratic stability.  See Oren 
Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 
YALE L.J. 1011, 1028 (2003) (“There exists a tension of ‘tragic dimensions’ between 
democratic values and responses to emergencies.”); see also William E. Scheuerman, Survey 
Article: Emergency Powers and the Rule of Law After 9/11, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 61, 68–74 (2006) 
(providing a useful survey of the legal scholarship on point up to 2006).  The Weimar case is 
often the focal point of legal scholars.  See, e.g., David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 
119 YALE L.J. 548, 598 (2009) (describing how the Nazis used their power within the 
government to “eliminate opposition and eventually repeal the entire Weimar Constitution 
itself”); Levinson & Balkin, supra note 20, at 1811 (noting the use of emergency powers in 
the Weimar Constitution by the Nazis). 
62. See Aziz Z. Huq, Uncertain Law in Uncertain Times: Emergency Powers and Lessons From 
South Asia, 13 CONSTELLATIONS 89, 93–95 (2006) (discussing the timing and political 
economy of the Indian emergency). 
63. See generally ROBERT BARROS, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DICTATORSHIP: PINOCHET, THE 
JUNTA, AND THE 1980 CONSTITUTION (2002) (documenting the end of military 
dictatorship in Chile). 
64. Powell & Thyne, supra note 60, at 255 fig.2 (presenting time trend in military coups); see also 
Peter D. Feaver, Civil-Military Relations, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 211, 218 (1999) (“[W]hile 
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amendments as means to dismantle democratic institutions in favor of 
competitive authoritarian or hybrid regimes.65  Hence the need for 
another category of anti-democratic change. 
2. Constitutional Retrogression 
A constitutional liberal democracy can degrade without collapsing.  In 
both Hungary and Poland, for example, elected governments have recently 
hastened to enact a suite of legal and institutional changes that 
simultaneously squeeze out electoral competition, undermine liberal rights 
of democratic participation, and emasculate legal stability and 
predictability.66  In Venezuela between 1999 and 2013, the regime 
established by Hugo Chávez aggregated executive power, limited political 
opposition, attacked academia, and stifled independent media in ways that 
align it with “classic authoritarian regimes.”67  Modifications of term limits 
are frequent.68  But, as we show in Part III, these are but some of the 
instruments in the retrogression toolkit.  Crucially, many of these practices 
are “conceal[ed] . . . under the mask of law.”69  Political scientists and others 
have a number of labels for this derogation from an existing set of practices, 
including “backsliding,”70 “de-democratization,”71 and the shift to 
  
coups have not entirely disappeared, they are certainly less frequent in many regions, and the 
coup success rate has also fallen.”). 
65. David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 211 (2013). 
66. See infra text accompanying notes 208–215, 227–232 (discussing democratic retrogression 
in Hungary and Poland); see also Bojan Bugarič & Tom Ginsburg, The Assault on 
Postcommunist Courts, J. DEMOCRACY, July 2016, at 69, 72–75 (summarizing retrogression 
in those contexts). 
67. Javier Corrales, The Authoritarian Resurgence: Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela, J. 
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2015, at 37, 37–46; see also Kirk A. Hawkins, Chavismo, Liberal 
Democracy, and Radical Democracy, 19 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 311, 314 (2016) (“[S]ince 
roughly 2006 . . . the regime has become a competitive authoritarian or electoral 
authoritarian regime.”). 
68. On the operation of term limits, and their failure, see Tom Ginsburg et al., On the 
Evasion of Executive Term Limits, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1807 (2011), and Janette 
Yarwood, The Power of Protest, J. DEMOCRACY, July 2016, at 51. 
69. Ozan O. Varol, Stealth Authoritarianism, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1673, 1685 (2015).  
Scholars have flagged the use of both ordinary law and constitutions to 
authoritarian ends.  See, e.g., Corrales, supra note 67, at 38 (defining “autocratic 
legalism” to include “the use, abuse, and non-use of the law” (emphasis omitted)); 
Landau, supra note 65, at 195 (defining “‘abusive constitutionalism’ as the use of 
mechanisms of constitutional change in order to make a state significantly less 
democratic than it was before”). 
70. Nancy Bermeo, On Democratic Backsliding, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2016, at 5, 5 
(defining democratic backsliding as “the state-led debilitation or elimination of 
any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy”).  In one 
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“democratorship.”72  Whatever it is called, its modal end-point is a hybrid 
regime that is neither pure democracy nor unfettered autocracy, but 
includes elements of both.  In rare cases, democratic elements recede 
sufficiently that even in the absence of open regime change, the situation is 
properly characterized as authoritarian.73 
How frequent is such incremental decay in democracies?  Figure 1 
presents trends in regime-type since the third wave of democracy began in 
the 1970s, using Freedom House categorizations.74  While democracy has 
generally advanced over the period, hybrid regimes have also diffused.  
Recent years show an uptake in both authoritarian and hybrid regimes, with 
slight regression of the number of democracies globally. 
 
  
quantitative study, “backslides” are distinguished from autocratic reversions by the 
number of Polity IV points lost in a given transition.  Polity is a 21-point scale of 
democracy that ranges from -10 (lowest level) to 10 (highest) and is frequently 
used in the literature in political science.  See José Alemán & David D. Yang, A 
Duration Analysis of Democratic Transitions and Authoritarian Backslides, 44 
COMP. POL. STUD. 1123, 1136 (2011). 
71. Charles Tilly, Inequality, Democratization, and De-Democratization, 21 SOC. 
THEORY 37, 40 (2003) (identifying structural conditions under which de-
democratization occurs, although without providing a precise definition). 
72. Kim Lane Scheppele, Worst Practices and the Transnational Legal Order (or How to 
Build a Constitutional “Democratorship” in Plain Sight), 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (on file with authors). 
73. See Lilia Shevtsova, The Authoritarian Resurgence: Forward to the Past in Russia, J. 
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2015, at 22, 30–33 (describing the Kremlin’s use of legal reforms to 
undermine democratic control). 
74. Freedom in the World 2016, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/freedom-world-2016 [https://perma.cc/5VZJ-6SEG]. 
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FIGURE 1.  Regime Types in the Third Wave75 
 
 
We coin the term “constitutional retrogression,” or more simply 
“retrogression,” to capture this phenomenon.  We borrow the term 
“retrogression” from the jurisprudence developed under section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act,76 a statutory provision that (for now at least) lies 
dormant.77  By splicing it together with the adjective “constitutional,” we aim 
to transpose a familiar concept employed at a local level to a national context. 
We define retrogression as a process of incremental (but ultimately 
still substantial) decay in the three basic predicates of democracy—
competitive elections, liberal rights to speech and association, and the rule 
of law.  It captures changes to the quality of a democracy that: (1) are on their 
own incremental in character and perhaps innocuous; (2) happen roughly in 
lockstep; and (3) involve deterioration of (a) the quality of elections, (b) 
speech and association rights, and (c) the rule of law. 
  
75. Produced in January 2017 by authors with data from Freedom House.  See generally id. 
76. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (introducing retrogression standard). 
77. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (invalidating the coverage formula 
that determined the scope of section 5’s application). 
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Importantly, retrogression occurs only when a substantial negative 
change occurs along all three margins.  Only when there is substantial change 
across all three institutional predicates of democracy is a system-level quality 
such as democratic contestation likely to be imperiled.78  Moreover, while a 
negative shift on any one margin might reduce the quality of democratic 
performance, retrogression risks a larger shift toward an illiberal 
democracy,79 or even an uncompetitive, one-party democratic system.80  It is 
thus distinct from authoritarian reversion for three reasons: first, it occurs 
slowly; second, it involves different mechanisms; and third, its modal end-
point is quasi-authoritarianism (although a further slide to authoritarianism 
is possible, as the Russian example shows).81 
Because retrogression occurs piecemeal, it necessarily involves many 
incremental changes to legal regimes and institutions.  Each of these changes 
may be innocuous or even defensible in isolation.  It is only by their cumulative, 
interactive effect that retrogression occurs.  A sufficient quantity of even 
incremental derogations from the democratic baseline, in our view, can 
precipitate a qualitative change that merits a shift in classification.82  Hence, 
evaluations of retrogression demand a system-wide perspective.  For just as 
democracy, liberalism, and the constitutional rule of law are properties of 
political systems as a whole, so too their degradation cannot be grasped except 
  
78. Might substantial decay occur in the rule of law and electoral competition without 
affecting liberal rights to speech and association, and would this be retrogression as we 
define it?  Because our three institutional predicates of democracy are closely 
intertwined, we think it will be the rare case in which two of three collapse while the 
third is left unaffected.  For the sake of clarity, we leave such cases to one side here. 
79. See Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 1997, at 
22(popularizing this term to identify countries with elections but not the full range of 
liberal rights). 
80. In a leading analysis of democratization, Samuel P. Huntington has argued that 
“the sustained failure of the major opposition political party to win office 
necessarily raises questions concerning the degree of competition permitted by the 
system.”  HUNTINGTON, supra note 28, at 8.  On the incidence and operation of 
one-party “democracies,” which of necessity lack for meaningful electoral 
competition, voter choice, accountability, or periodic turnover, see PRZEWORSKI ET 
AL., supra note 24, at 57–69, which lists countries that have experienced one-party 
dominance notwithstanding democratic elections including, among others, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Gambia, Honduras, Ivory Coast, 
Madagascar, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Senegal, South Africa, and Turkey. 
81. In 2017, events in Turkey suggested that country may be following the same path.  
Cf. Dexter Filkins, The End of Democracy in Turkey, NEW YORKER (Jan. 3, 2017), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-end-of-democracy-in-turkey 
[https://perma.cc/K6HH-P7CC] (making this point about the Erdogan regime). 
82. For a similar argument, see Kim Lane Scheppele, The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: 
Why Governance Checklists Do Not Work, 26 GOVERNANCE 559, 560–62 (2013). 
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from a systemic perspective.83  As a result, there will be cases where disputes 
arise as to whether a sufficient aggregate amount of backsliding has occurred.  
The existence of contentious border-line cases as a result of necessary 
vagueness, however, does not undermine the utility of the concept.84 
Consider, for example, the New Deal’s changes in federal governance.  
These have been characterized as a catastrophic avulsion in the constitutional 
order, and also a redemptive moment in American history.85  Those who 
would rank the New Deal as a retrogression might point to the derogation 
from an informal two-term limit on presidents, as well as fundamental 
changes in property rights and the rule of law.86  The presidential effort to 
pack the Supreme Court represents a low point for the rule of law in the 
United States, and is a technique that has been followed by modern-day 
illiberal democrats.87  They might also point to the creation of New Deal 
programs that engendered new constituencies supportive of the Democratic 
political coalition.88 
But while conceding that these arguments have some force, we 
conclude that the New Deal does not meet our tripartite definition of 
retrogression (even if it is objectionable on libertarian or originalist 
grounds).  We see little evidence that even with the abrogation of the 
unwritten norm against three-term presidents, the scope of electoral 
competition was damaged.  Simply put, this was not a moment at which 
the government blocked partisan competition or narrowed the franchise.  To 
  
83. See supra text accompanying notes 31–53. 
84. More generally, we resist the proposition that for a concept to be useful it must be 
subject to quantification.  So long as a concept’s vagueness in application is recognized, 
we see no reason to reject it.  The canonical examples of vague but useful concepts are 
baldness and a heap of wheat.  See Dominic Hyde, The Sorites Paradox, in VAGUENESS: 
A GUIDE 1, 1–2 (Giuseppina Ronzitti ed., 2011). 
85. Compare RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN 
QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 45–71 (2014), with 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). 
86. We recognize that by one influential definition of the rule of law, that of Hayek, 
the New Deal was the very antithesis of the concept.  FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE 
ROAD TO SERFDOM 72–87 (1944).  Our own working definition, drawn from Lon 
Fuller’s eight criteria, see FULLER, supra note 36, at 33–94, would tolerate New Deal 
reforms as within the realm of the rule of law. 
87. See infra notes 207–215 and accompanying text (discussing Hungary and Poland). 
88. See, e.g., McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 180, 180–83 (1999) (describing the Administrative Procedure Act as 
deck-stacking).  Many state transformations have lock-in effects because the benefits 
that flow from newly created institutions or policies create supportive constituencies.  
See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 17–
20 (2004).  Examples include social security and the mortgage interest deduction. 
How to Lose Your Constitutional Democracy 99 
	
the contrary, to the extent it had progressive redistributive effects, the New Deal 
may well have enabled effective more democratic participation.  Nor was the 
New Deal accompanied by notable losses of speech and association rights 
in comparison to the ex ante status quo.  And while political 
entrenchment occurred, it did not limit political competition.  Rather, 
taking the democratic status quo as a baseline, there is a meaningful 
difference between constitutional change that operates through the 
conferral of benefits and a change that either eliminates democratic 
competition or liberal rights necessary for democratic competition.  
Because not all three institutional prerequisites of democracy were damaged in 
the New Deal, we think it does not fit our definition of retrogression.89  Even if 
readers disagree with this specific example, though, we hope that our 
definitional exegesis provides a useful frame for analysis and challenge to 
this assessment. 
*  *  * 
This Part has stipulated the two pivotal elements of our analysis.  First, we 
have set forth an understanding of constitutional liberal democracy, which 
provides a normative benchmark from which our investigation starts.  Second, 
we have distinguished two separate pathways along which democracies might 
erode.  The first, authoritarian reversion, involves a quick and complete 
breakdown of democratic politics and replacement by authoritarianism.  The 
second, constitutional retrogression, involves a more incremental deterioration 
in the quality of democratic regimes, which typically ends in a quasi-
authoritarian status quo.  In the following two Parts, we use comparative 
law and politics scholarship to examine the risk of each species of 
democratic failure.  We then deploy familiar tools of legal and institutional 
analysis to evaluate the magnitude of each threat in the U.S. context. 
II. AMERICA IN THE SHADOW OF AUTHORITARIAN REVERSION 
This Part considers the risk of authoritarian reversion and the role of the 
U.S. Constitution in either stanching or exacerbating that threat.  We begin by 
exploring comparative experience with authoritarian reversion, emphasizing the 
  
89. Perhaps the best example of retrogression in U.S. history is the end of southern 
Reconstruction, commonly called Redemption—a moment at which democratic space 
shrank, African Americans were de facto excluded from politics, and the rule of law 
was violently flouted.  See C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 
1877–1913, at 1–22 (1951). 
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pivotal role that military coups and emergency powers play.  We then turn to 
the domestic context, and consider whether the United States should be 
viewed as exceptional in the sense of being immune from such reversion.  We 
conclude that there is no reason to think that America is exceptional, but 
ample reason to think that the mechanisms of authoritarian reversion are 
unlikely to have purchase here.  This is due in part to a secular decline in the 
rate of authoritarian reversion and in part to constitutional law (if not the 
constitutional text), which has found ways to accommodate the risk of such 
reversions via military coup and emergency powers. 
A. When Do Democracies Collapse Into Authoritarianism? 
Political scientists have documented a non-trivial set of cases in 
which a democracy reverts to an authoritarian regime.  A canonical 
example is the abrogation of Weimar democracy by the Nazi party that 
occurred during the early 1930s in Germany.90  More recently, on May 20, 
2014, the Thai military suspended the constitution and ended democratic 
rule under a caretaker regime that had been calling for elections.91  A year 
earlier, the Egyptian military ousted the elected president, Mohamed 
Morsi, and installed a general, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, in his stead.92  While the 
Thai junta has adopted a constitution promising a transfer of power to 
civilians, the constitution adopted in May 2017 in fact assures continuing 
military rule for the near term.93  And in Egypt, the military regime 
currently remains in place with no meaningful prospect of democratic 
restoration in view.94 
Authoritarian reversions are characterized by an abrupt change in 
regime type from democratic to authoritarian.  They are commonly 
  
90. For a recent account of the Weimar’s fall that sets it in a broader historical 
perspective, see ERIC D. WEITZ, WEIMAR GERMANY: PROMISE AND TRAGEDY 331–60 
(2007), which also traces the intellectual and political origins of the Nazi seizure of 
power. 
91. A Coup Ordained?  Thailand’s Prospects for Stability, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Dec. 3, 2014), 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/coup-ordained-thailand-s-
prospects-stability [https://perma.cc/HQJ3-SA4S] (describing the May 22, 2014 coup). 
92. Eric Trager, Egypt’s Durable Misery: Why Sisi’s Regime Is Stable, FOREIGN AFF. (July 21, 
2015), https://foreignaffairs.org/articles/egypt/2015-07-21/egypts-durable-misery 
[https://perma.cc/ UYM5-Z9QU]. 
93. David Streckfuss, In Thailand, a King’s Coup?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/09/opinion/in-thailand-a-kings-coup.html. 
94. For an interesting assessment of the regime’s apparent stability, but potential long-term 
weakness, see Jack Shenker, Egypt’s Rickety Dictatorship, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/opinion/egypts-rickety-dictatorship.html. 
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associated with military coups95 and the use of legal states of emergency.96  
Coups often occur in moments of crisis, when military leaders invoke 
legitimating constitutional provisions to claim the mantle of a neutral and 
moderating power.97  Military subordination of democratic regimes can be 
accomplished through the mechanism of emergency powers.98  Evaluating 
Latin American experience with emergency powers, one scholar has 
concluded: “No elections, no delicately orchestrated set of presidentialist 
musical chairs, and no transitions from authoritarian to elected 
governments will succeed in consolidating constitutional democracy 
without drastic reform of these constitutional foundations of tyranny.”99 
Yet authoritarian reversions are now quite rare.100  A 2011 study by 
Gero Erdmann found that only five of fifty-two instances of democratic 
backsliding over a thirty-year period involved a full transition from 
democracy to authoritarian rule.  Perhaps because these instances are 
relatively isolated, the literature has developed the countervailing concept 
of democratic consolidation: the claim that after some time, democracy 
becomes “the only game in town” in a given national context, such that a 
  
95. See PAUL BROOKER, NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: THEORY, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 
59 (2000) (discussing linkage between military coups and emergencies); FRANCIS 
FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY 281–83 (2014) (discussing the role 
of military interventions in generating democratic instability in South America). 
96. See Arend Lijphart, Emergency Powers and Emergency Regimes: A Commentary, 18 ASIAN 
SURV. 401, 401 (1978) (noting that the “breakdown of democracy” is often “justified in terms 
of the existence of an emergency of one kind or another”). 
97. Juan J. Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration, in THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC 
REGIMES 3, 74 (Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan eds., 1978). 
98. See, e.g., BRIAN LOVEMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF TYRANNY: REGIMES OF EXCEPTION IN 
SPANISH AMERICA 173–75 (1993) (positing this linkage in the Colombian context). 
99. Id. at 9.  Other scholars have argued that the extensive military misuse of 
emergency powers in the Latin American context does not reflect the 
undesirability of emergency powers per se, but instead the need for careful 
institutional design to limit their authoritarian risks.  See Gabriel L. Negretto & 
José Antonio Aguilar Rivera, Liberalism and Emergency Powers in Latin America: 
Reflections on Carl Schmitt and the Theory of Constitutional Dictatorship, 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1797, 1810 (2000) (“While initially helpful during the period of 
state-building, emergency provisions in Latin America soon became, in many 
cases, an instrument to prevent the emergence of opposition movements, to 
restrict the levels of political competition, and to curtail civil liberties.”). 
100. Gero Erdmann, Decline of Democracy: Loss of Quality, Hybridisation and Breakdown of 
Democracy, in REGRESSION OF DEMOCRACY? 26 (Gero Erdmann & Marianne Kneuer 
eds., 2011) (noting also that four of these occurred before 1989); see also LUST & 
WALDNER, supra note 17, at 5 (discussing Erdmann’s study). 
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reversion to authoritarianism becomes much less likely.101  While 
consolidation has been fairly well studied, and seems to be best predicted 
by favorable socioeconomic conditions as well as a contagion effect,102 the 
infrequency of authoritarian reversions creates an inference problem.  In 
the absence of a sufficient number of cases, it is hard to draw secure 
inferences about what structural or situational factors conduce to 
democratic breakdowns. 
Nevertheless, a few regularities emerge in the empirical and qualitative 
literature on given cases.  First, none of the five cases of authoritarian 
reversion identified in Erdmann’s 2011 study occurred in a high income 
country.103  Similarly, José Alemán and David Yang find that “by far the best 
guarantor of democratic stability is a high level of economic 
development.”104  Recall, however, that Erdmann’s study of democratic 
failure in fifty-two countries found democratic backsliding rather than full-
scale reversion in forty-eight of them.105  This suggests that democratic 
backsliding of some sort is far more common when the end-state is a hybrid 
or incomplete form of democracy.  The effect of economic development on 
backsliding, therefore, should not be assumed. 
Second, scholars find that the probability of authoritarian reversion 
declines with age.106  According to Milan Svolik’s careful 2008 study, “any 
country that has been democratic for 52 or more years as of 2001 is 
estimated to be consolidated with at least 90% probability.”107  Svolik also 
finds that the critical factor in predicting sudden democratic collapse is 
economic recession.  Since then, however, a military coup in the relatively 
wealthy and seemingly stable democracy of Thailand deposed the elected 
Shinawatra government in May 2014, showing that neither low income 
nor recession is strictly necessary for a sudden authoritarian reversion at 
  
101. Andreas Schedler, What Is Democratic Consolidation?, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1998, at 91, 
91–92; see also Svolik, supra note 57, at 164 (discussing democratic consolidation). 
102. Mark Gasiorowski & Timothy J. Power, The Structural Determinants of Democratic 
Consolidation Evidence From the Third World, 31 COMP. POL. STUD. 74, 764 (1998) 
(discussing factors and also noting that high inflation undermines consolidation). 
103. Erdmann, supra note 100, at 34. 
104. Alemán & Yang, supra note 70, at 1137.  For similar findings, see PRZEWORSKI ET 
AL., supra note 24, at 50–51, and Kapstein & Converse, supra note 9, at 61. 
105. Erdmann, supra note 100, at 26. 
106. See Svolik, supra note 57, at 166. 
107. Id. at 164. 
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the hands of the armed forces.108  Further, there is some evidence that the 
current authoritarian swing in Thailand is deeper than in previous 
instances.109  Even given the Thai counterexample, nations experiencing 
such reversions tend to have shorter and more insecure histories of 
political competition than the contemporary United States.  Japan, for 
example, had a weakly institutionalized democracy in the 1920s that gave 
way to military dominance.110  The Spanish Republic lasted just five years 
before Franco came to power in 1938.111 
To makes these points more concrete, Table 1 below presents data on a 
number of other instances of authoritarian reversions, drawing on 
definitions provided by the Polity database.  We focus on the countries 
with the longest continuous experiences of democracy before reversion. 
  
108. See A Coup Ordained?, supra note 91; see also Claudio Sopranzetti, Thailand’s 
Relapse: The Implications of the May 2014 Coup, 75 J. ASIAN STUD. 299, 314–15 
(2016). 
109. Sopranzetti, supra note 108, at 310 (describing the coup-leader institutionalizing 
paternalistic ideas of limited democracy). 
110. See HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 16–20 (1992). 
111. See ANTONY BEEVOR, THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 340–41 (Cassell Military Paperbacks 
2001) (1982) (describing Franco’s seizure of power). 
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TABLE 1.  Longest Periods of Democracy Before Reversion112 
Country 
Democracy 
years 
(inclusive) 
Number of 
democracy 
years 
GDP per 
capita in year 
of reversion 
(Penn World 
Tables)
Cause of reversion 
France 1876–1939 64 Unavailable Invasion/coup d’état 
Greece 1864–1914 51 Unavailable Coup d’état 
Venezuela 1958–2006 49 $9508 Consolidation of one-
party dominance 
Sri Lanka 1948–81 34 $1067 
Tainted election followed 
by repressive 
constitutional 
amendment and political 
violence 
Uruguay 1942–72 31 $4917 Coup d’état 
Gambia 1965–93 28 $1219 Coup d’état 
Spain 1899–1922 24 Unavailable Constitutional 
dictatorship by general 
Chile 1955–72 18 $4248 Coup d’état 
Ecuador 1990–2007 18 $6074 Consolidation of one-
party rule 
Estonia 1917–33 17 Unavailable Coup d’état 
Fiji 1970–86 17 $3089 Coup d’état 
 
The question raised by this table, of course, is whether any of these 
examples provide pathmarking precedent for the United States.  That 
most of these instances occur in poorer countries, with less rich 
democratic histories, is relevant though not definitive. 
  
112. This table has been created with data collected in 2017 from the Polity IV Database and 
Penn World Tables.  To access the Polity IV Database, see Monty G. Marshall & Ted 
Robert Gurr, Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, CTR. SYSTEMIC PEACE (June 6, 
2014), http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm [https://perma.cc/22DY-
Z2EZ], which notes that democracy is defined as ratings of six or above on the twenty-
one-point Polity Scale.  To access the Penn World Tables, see Alan Heston et al., Penn 
World Tables 6.3, CHASS (Oct. 2010), http://dc1.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt 
[https://perma.cc/3YPV-YTY8]. 
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B. The Risk of Authoritarian Reversion in the United States 
We begin our analysis of the risk of authoritarian reversion by setting 
forth previous estimates.  We then bring to bear both comparative and 
domestic analytic tools to provide a more closely argued and well-supported 
evaluation of that risk. 
1. Prior Estimates of Authoritarian Reversion Risk 
Is there any risk of wholesale democratic collapse in the United States?  
There are two standard approaches to this problem in the legal and 
constitutional scholarship.  One perceives a stark, clear, and present danger.  
The other rejects the possibility out of hand.  We set forth these competing 
diagnoses before presenting our own analysis.  Unlike the standard accounts, 
we conclude that the risk of authoritarian reversion is non-zero but small.  
Comparative evidence and careful examination of U.S. constitutional 
institutions and rules provide some ground for comfort that sudden 
democratic reversions are unlikely absent serious miscalculations by political 
leaders. 
The scholarship in this area is polarized.  On the one hand, there are a 
number of scholars who have expressed concern over the possibility of 
authoritarian reversion either through emergency powers or military 
coup.  Among the most prominent of these is Bruce Ackerman, who has 
raised the prospect of a reversion via military coup.113  As a troubling 
harbinger, Ackerman flags the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which 
elevated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to a cabinet level position and 
thereby created a unified military voice on the National Security 
Council.114  He also questions the resilience of civilian control of the 
military, especially in the face of presidential overreaching.115  In a similar 
vein, Jonathan Turley expresses concern about “the expansion of the 
military into a largely autonomous and independent governing system” 
  
113. ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 9–10, 24–36 (predicting “an increasingly politicized military” 
and describing the legal shifts that facilitate it).  At least one military officer has expressed 
similar concerns.  See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The Origins of the American Military Coup of 
2012, PARAMETERS, Winter 2010–11, at 107. 
114. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
433, 101 Stat. 992; ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 45–63. 
115. ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 84–85. 
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that is largely free of civilian control.116  With respect to emergency 
powers, Jules Lobel canvassed the dense thicket of statutory emergency 
powers in 1989 and spied there “a grave danger of authoritarian rule in the 
conduct of foreign affairs.”117  Finally, fear of authoritarian tyranny has 
often coalesced around the rise of executive power.118  There has been, as is 
oft observed, a secular and fairly continuous increase in executive power 
over the last several decades, much of it based on vague Congressional 
authorizations that respond to arguments about emergency or military 
necessity.119  Much of this concern focuses not just on the executive branch 
in general, but on the President in particular.120 
The risk of a military coup has received close attention in the political 
science literature.  To stave it off, Samuel Huntington advocated “objective 
civilian control” of the military, which entailed “militarizing the military, 
making them the tool of the state.”121  But Huntington saw civilian control as 
“extraconstitutional, a part of our political tradition but not of our 
constitutional tradition,”122 rather than as a function of the Constitution’s 
provisions speaking to the allocation of military powers.  Indeed, Huntington 
viewed the separation of military-related powers between Congress and the 
  
116. Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military 
Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 657 (2002); accord 
ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME EVERYTHING: 
TALES FROM THE PENTAGON (2016) (developing a similar account of the military as an 
expansive institution deployed to an excessive number of military and non-military ends). 
117. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1433 (1989). 
118. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 87–89. 
119. Levinson & Balkin, supra note 20, at 1789; see also Rebecca Ingber, Obama’s War Powers 
Legacy and the Internal Forces That Entrench Executive Power, 110 AM. J. INT’L. L. 680 (2016).  
Other accounts raise doubts about the perceived growth of presidential power, noting the 
frictional effect of conflict within the executive branch as a whole.  Aziz Z. Huq, The 
President and the Detainees, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 499 (2017) (documenting successful 
bureaucratic resistance and friction against a presidential agenda, which spilled over into 
interbranch conflict). 
120. See Levinson & Balkin, supra note 20, at 1840 (arguing that in fact emergency powers are 
dispersed through the administrative state). 
121. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 83 (1957); id. at 68–69 (suggesting that 
civilians would set policy ends, while the military would supply “instrumental means”).  A 
similar theme is to be found in the other leading theorization of civilian-military relations.  
See PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS 12 (2003) (noting that the “military subordination 
conception” is the “sine qua non of all civil-military theory”). 
122. HUNTINGTON, supra note 121, at 190 (drawing an analogy to the national political party 
system). 
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executive as an error, because it worked as “a perpetual invitation, if not an 
irresistible force, drawing military leaders into political conflicts.”123 
On the other side of the ledger, there is some scholarship that embraces 
the prospect of democratic recession in favor of dictatorial powers, and some 
that doubts the risk is at all real.  Most famously, Clinton Rossiter’s 1948 
influential monograph on Constitutional Dictatorship embraced the possibility 
that “leaders could take dictatorial action in [democracy’s] defense” out of a 
concern that the state could “not survive its first real crisis” in the absence of 
such an extraordinary power.124  In that moment of crisis, Rossiter predicted a 
dictator could and should take any action necessary for “the preservation of 
the independence of the state, the maintenance of the existing constitutional 
order, and the defense of the political and social liberties of the people.”125  
Alternatively, scholars such as Trevor Morrison have responded to warnings 
such as Ackerman’s by labeling them as “exercise[s] in unwarranted 
alarmism.”126  In a related optimistic vein, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule 
have diagnosed what they view as an unhealthy dose of “tyrannophobia” in 
American political culture.127  They trace this fear of executive tyranny back to 
concerns about the British throne, which infused the Founding period, and 
suggest that tyrannophobia itself cannot inhibit tyranny but is instead 
more likely to be epiphenomenal.128 
Not all of these analyses, however, account for comparative experience 
with authoritarian reversion.  Hence, they typically offer no baseline estimate 
of how great the risk of such a flip away from democratic control might be.  
Nor do they all account for the specific pathways that link government 
powers (such as emergency authorities or military policy-making) to 
  
123. Id. at 177; accord Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of Powers, 
90 TEX. L. REV. 797, 824 (2012) (“For Huntington, the separation-of-powers reality that 
Congress may call on military officers to testify, for example, places officers who feel 
personal or professional loyalty to their Commander in Chief in a position that 
compromises their ability to offer unvarnished expert views.”). 
124. CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN 
DEMOCRACIES 13 (1948). 
125. Id. at 7. 
126. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1693 (2011) 
(reviewing ACKERMAN, supra note 20).  Morrison, unfortunately, focuses on Ackerman’s 
account of the Office of Legal Counsel, rather than his concern with the ascendancy of the 
military.  See id. 
127. Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Tyrannophobia, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
321 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2012). 
128. Id. (expressing skepticism at the relationship). 
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democratic destabilization.129  Lobel, for example, infers a risk of democratic 
derogation from the mere existence of broad statutory emergency powers.  
He does not provide a clear explanation of executive branch actors’ incentives 
to use these powers, or opponents’ incentives to resist them.  Posner and 
Vermeule, by contrast, reject the possibility that widely held “tyrannophobic” 
views in fact play an important role in resisting the slide away from democratic 
norms.130  Given the recent wearing away of popular aversion to military 
control in any case, their diagnosis may now need revision.  As we explained 
in the Introduction, at least some percentage of the American population 
seems to be flirting with tyrannophilia in ways that alter the expected 
dynamics of political and institutional change.131 
2. Reconsidering the Risk of Authoritarian Reversion in a 
Comparative and Historical Light 
The risk of authoritarian reversion—a wholesale shift from civilian, 
democratic control to an authoritarian alternative—is in our estimate very 
low even given the demographic, socioeconomic, and transnational trends 
described in the Introduction.132  To call this risk small, however, is not to say 
that it is nonexistent.  But given the lower transaction costs of constitutional 
retrogression demonstrated in Part III, we think that it is far more likely that 
democratic decay will be piecemeal and incremental rather than wholesale 
and rapid.  Our conclusion flows from both the lessons developed through 
the application of a comparative lens, and also through close attention to the 
specific historical and constitutional mechanisms that regulate the risk of a 
military coup and the abuse of emergency powers. 
To begin with, comparative and historical experience does not suggest 
that the United States is at the cusp of authoritarian reversion.  As we have 
explained, the latter generally occurs in recently established and relatively 
impoverished democracies.  The United States, despite its large economic 
inequalities, is neither of these. 
Moreover, the history of the United States has seen some significant uses 
and abuses of emergency powers, ranging from Lincoln’s suspension of the 
  
129. Ackerman is the main exception here, insofar as he sketches hypothetical trajectories 
by which a military coup could occur.  ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 63–64; see also 
Dunlap, supra note 113, at 2. 
130. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 127, at 321. 
131. See Foa & Mounk, supra note 5, at 13. 
132. See supra text accompanying notes 5–7. 
How to Lose Your Constitutional Democracy 109 
	
writ of habeas corpus without Congress, to the Japanese internment.133  We 
do not wish to minimize the human cost of these historical instances, but it is 
worth noting that none of them has been accompanied by an actual reversion 
of democratic norms, or even the shadow of such a collapse in democratic 
institutions.  History, to be sure, does not directly constrain.  But the absence 
of democratic collapses in the historical record is not without significance in a 
national context where historical antecedents and constitutional custom have 
a measure of restraining precedential force.134  Consistent with this intuition, 
cross-national studies suggest that histories of governmental instability are 
predictive of subsequent democratic collapse.135  In terms of political 
incentives, the absence of a positive history of democratic suspensions creates 
a large dose of uncertainty over the distributive and political consequences of 
authoritarian reversion.  This means there is no subset of interest groups that 
can confidently predict it will gain from democracy’s caesura.136 
A potential response to comparative evidence in particular is to parry 
with the claim that America is somehow “exceptional” and hence will 
follow idiosyncratic paths dissimilar to international comparators.  We 
are skeptical of claims to uniqueness in general.137  Absent some concrete 
reason to think otherwise, there is no reason to view the United States as 
standing outside or beyond historical patterns of institutional and 
political development.  To the extent that the evidence supports a claim of 
American exceptionalism in our context, that claim must rely on the 
unusual longevity of the American constitution.  At 229 years and 
  
133. See generally GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (2004). 
134. On the use of such practice by courts, see Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, 
Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 453 (2012). 
135. See Abraham Diskin et al., Why Democracies Collapse: The Reasons for Democratic Failure 
and Success, 26 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 291, 303–04 (2005) (reporting results from logistic 
models of democratic survival). 
136. Our argument here is not that there is “positive feedback” from the historical practice 
of democracy.  Cf. PIERSON, supra note 88, at 20–21.  It is rather that risk aversion 
interacts with an absence of historical exemplars to make some political choices less 
attractive.  A prospective military leader in Thailand or Turkey, with a long history of 
coups, has much more information on the likely reaction of various forces in society. 
137. Stephen M. Walt, The Myth of American Exceptionalism, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 11, 2011, 
12:40 AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/the-myth-of-american-exceptionalism 
[https://perma.cc/7GTA-5BC9].  Sometimes (mistakenly) attributed to Joseph Stalin, the 
phrase “American exceptionalism” emerged in communist circles to explain the apparent 
immunity of the United States to proletarian revolution.  Ben Zimmer, Did Stalin Really 
Coin “American Exceptionalism”?, SLATE: LEXICON VALLEY (Sept. 27, 2013, 12:12 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/lexicon_valley/2013/09/27/american_exceptionalism_ne
ither_joseph_stalin_nor_alexis_de_tocqueville.html [https://perma.cc/W2MD-
YGYH] (explaining origins of the term). 
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counting, the Constitution is the oldest such national document in the 
world by a substantial margin.138  National elections have persisted 
uninterrupted through both civil war and international conflict.  To the 
extent that historical practice provides a guide for current participants in 
political life, there is a sense in which wholesale authoritarian reversion 
lies outside the “feasible choice set” of current political tactics.139 
In summary, the weight of comparative and historical experience 
suggests that authoritarian reversion is not a substantial possibility in the 
contemporary United States.  Even if characterized as a low probability risk, a 
sudden move away from democracy cannot be ruled out without better 
characterizing the relevant probability distribution.140  To this end, we turn 
now to the relationship between the specific mechanisms of authoritarian 
reversion and the constitutional regulation of emergency powers and civil-
military relations. 
3. Constitutional Barriers and Incitements to Authoritarian Reversions 
Comparative experience suggests that the most important mechanisms 
of authoritarian reversion involve either civilian abuse of emergency power or 
a military coup d’état.  We consider how these risks are identified and 
managed in the constitutional text, and through both constitutional 
institutions and doctrines. 
Consider first the question of emergency powers.  Some ninety percent 
of constitutions in force today have some provisions on emergency powers.141  
Drawing on Machiavelli’s analysis of the Roman institution of a 
dictatorship,142 many constitutions tend to anticipate the onset of an 
  
138. See ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 101 (2009). 
139. The term “feasible choice set,” we recognize, is “vague, ambiguous, and context dependent.”  
Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J. 307, 314 (2008).  We rely here on 
the idea of historical experience as a baseline for current political choice to give it content. 
140. Cf. Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four Auditors, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1641, 1673 (2006) (“[Q]uantifying cataclysmic liability requires one to be able to 
say something about the probabilistic distribution of liability exposure, something I 
shall refer to below as ‘right-tail risk.’” (emphasis omitted)). 
141. Christian Bjørnskov & Stefan Voigt, The Determinants of Emergency Constitutions 19 
(Mar. 23, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2697144; see also COMP. CONSTS. PROJECT, 
http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org [https://perma.cc/4UVB-7GUM] (data on file 
with authors and the UCLA Law Review). 
142. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency 
Powers, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 210, 211–13 (2004) (discussing the Roman dictatorship). 
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emergency and provide temporally limited powers to address it.143  Four out 
of five of these also will stipulate that declarations of emergency require at 
least two institutional actors identified in the constitution (for example a 
legislature and a chief executive or a court), as a safeguard against unilateral 
abuse.144  The increase in legal authority made available to the government 
during the state of emergency also varies, with a common approach being to 
carve out particular rules that may not be derogated from under any 
circumstances.  These are not mere abstractions: “Between 1985 and 2014, at 
least 137 countries declared a state of emergency at least once.”145 
Against this background, the U.S. Constitution is strikingly ambiguous 
as to how emergencies alter the bounds of governmental powers, or 
redistribute authority between different parts of the body politic.  Article I 
allows for Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the 
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions,”146 a power 
that formally shifts authority from the states to the national level.  Another 
clause in Article I forbids the suspension of the right to file for habeas corpus 
“unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require 
it.”147  Although these texts are not pellucidly clear, it is generally agreed that 
this language allocates to Congress, not the president, decisions about 
emergency detention-related powers.148 
On the maintenance of democratic institutions, the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment provides for vice-presidential succession,149 but the constitutional 
  
143. See NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON LIVY 74–75 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Nathan 
Tarcov trans., 1996) (“[R]epublics should have a like mode [to the dictatorship] among their 
orders . . . . [A] republic will never be perfect unless it has provided for everything with its 
laws and has established a remedy for every accident and given the mode to govern it.”). 
144. COMP. CONSTS. PROJECT, supra note 141. 
145. Bjørnskov & Voigt, supra note 141, at 2 (providing a history of the use of emergency powers 
in constitutions). 
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. 
147. Id. § 9, cl. 2. 
148. See Amy Coney Barrett, Suspension and Delegation, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 257–58 
(2014) (“Scholars and courts have overwhelmingly endorsed the position that, Lincoln’s 
unilateral suspensions of the writ notwithstanding, the Constitution gives Congress the 
exclusive authority to decide when the predicates specified by the Suspension Clause are 
satisfied.”).  Scholars have debated the legal effect of a suspension, and in particular 
whether it renders otherwise unlawful detentions lawful.  Compare Trevor W. Morrison, 
Hamdi’s Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization?, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 411 (2006) 
(focusing on Congressional role in a limited delegation), with Amanda L. Tyler, 
Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600 (2009) (suggesting broad powers). 
149. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1 (establishing that upon removal, death, or resignation of the 
President, the Vice President becomes President).  The succession rules are otherwise 
governed by statute.  See Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1), (b), (d)(1) 
(2012). 
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text is otherwise silent as to disruptions of the presidential or congressional 
election process.  Rather than providing for emergencies, the Constitution 
leaves to Congress and the several states the authority to establish a timetable 
for federal elections.150  It gives no indication of how either derailing 
disruptions to voting (e.g., natural disasters or terrorist attacks) or ex post 
evidence of outcome-determinative fraud would be addressed.  Finally, the 
Constitution guarantees that states must have a “republican form of 
government,” which might (if ultimately construed by the courts) prove 
salient to the threat of authoritarian reversion at the subnational level.151 
In practice, this gap-filled textual regime allows the executive great 
latitude in crafting responses to emergencies that do not disrupt the political 
process.  Consider the historical record of suspensions of the writ of habeas 
corpus.  A cursory glance at this history undermines the Framers’ empirical 
assumption that Congress would be an active agent in policing the 
constitutional scheme.  In practice, the executive generally takes the initiative 
while Congress remains a relatively passive actor.  During the Civil War, 
Congress suspended the writ only after Lincoln had already de facto done so.  
President Ulysses Grant suspended the writ in some parts of the South 
pursuant to the Reconstruction-era Civil Rights Act.152  And President 
Roosevelt suspended the writ in Hawaii during World War II under a 41-year 
old statutory authorization.153 
Often, the requirement of statutory authorization turns out to be a 
parchment barrier.  The executive, for example, has consistently asserted 
authority to use military force in emergencies even absent congressional 
permission.154  Nor do enumerated individual rights provide a substantial 
restraint upon the executive.  As a doctrinal matter, many individual rights 
have been glossed as containing an exigency exception,155 or provide less 
resistance when emergency or security concerns are proposed as the relevant 
  
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
151. Id. art. IV, § 4.  On subnational authoritarianism, see GIBSON, supra note 49. 
152. See Barrett, supra note 148, at 254.  See generally Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. 
153. Barrett, supra note 148, at 252.  See generally Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863, ch. 81, 
12 Stat. 755; HARRY SCHEIBER & JUNE SCHEIBER, BAYONETS IN PARADISE: MARTIAL LAW IN 
HAWAII DURING WORLD WAR II (2016) (recounting consequences of suspension). 
154. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Constitutional Law of Agenda Control, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1401, 1429, 
1445 (2016) (discussing the shifting allocation of war powers in the more general context of 
interbranch relations). 
155. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459–63 (2011) (allowing the exigency exception to 
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement to control even when police created the 
exigency). 
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governmental interest.156  In any event, most constitutional remedies are 
generally only available when a clear constitutional rule has been willfully 
violated—a condition unlikely to obtain in exigent circumstances.157 
As a result of these various considerations, constitutional bounds are quite 
elastic in real or purported emergencies, with little reason for officials to 
anticipate either ex ante injunctive barriers or ex post damages actions.  In 
addition, Congress has enacted a wide range of statutory emergency powers of 
surveillance, detention, and force, all of which, in net, sustain and expand this 
elasticity.158  As a result, it will be the rare instance in which a desired emergency 
response cannot be routed through existing statutory and constitutional 
channels.  Hence, while legal elasticity in the context of exigency has the 
arguable cost of failing to limit, prohibit, or punish hasty, unwise, or 
discriminatory actions, it has the benefit of mitigating the need to adopt 
extra-legal measures.159  Emergencies can be managed within the framework 
of “ordinary” statutory, doctrinal, and textual frameworks: There is no cause 
for disruption of the democratic system so as to secure additional powers that 
might be perceived as necessary.  Moreover, to the extent that Justice Jackson 
was correct that “emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies,”160 the 
constitutional scheme may have the benefit of limiting downstream 
destabilization after policy compulsions subside.  In combination, these factors 
mean that security-related emergencies, even if they impose grave costs to 
individual welfare and rights, do not press toward political disruption.   
To be sure, this leaves open the somewhat smaller risk that an 
emergency proves an opportunity for a would-be autocratic leader to snuff 
out democratic competition with the aid of the military.  But since much the 
  
156. See Aziz Z. Huq, Preserving Political Speech From Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. SIDEBAR 16, 21–22 (2012) (criticizing the Court for its deferential attitude to the 
government’s security-related claims).  For an example of the flaccid application of 
strict scrutiny when the government invokes security as a justification for infringing 
First Amendment rights, see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40 
(2010). 
157. See Huq, supra note 51, at 20–40 (describing current regime of constitutional remedies). 
158. See SPEC. S. COMM. ON NAT’L EMERGENCIES & DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS, 93D CONG., A 
BRIEF HISTORY OF EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES, at v (Comm. Print 1974) 
(“Emergency government has become the norm.”). 
159. Cf. Gross, supra note 61, at 1023–24 (advocating an “Extra-Legal Measures model” 
pursuant to which “public officials . . . may act extralegally when they believe that such 
action is necessary for protecting the nation and the public in the face of calamity, 
provided that they openly and publicly acknowledge the nature of their actions” and 
then allow for public sanction).  For criticism of the feasibility of this model, see Huq, 
supra note 62, at 99–102. 
160. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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same result can be achieved by means less likely to provoke popular 
mobilization, we think this is unlikely absent a gross miscalculation.  In short, 
we think the current constitutional regime for emergencies does not 
engender substantial pressure toward authoritarian reversion because of its 
elasticity (even as, we stress, it does a rather miserable job of resisting 
violations of individual rights violations). 
On the other hand, the constitutional regime of presidential succession 
is underspecified, while doubts have been raised about the legality of the 
1947 gap-filling statute161 and the specter of disputes among potential 
presidential successors has been raised.162  If an emergency succession after 
the incapacitation of both the president and the vice-president were to be 
derailed by litigation, the Constitution contains no provision for early 
elections as a democratic replacement option.  It thus seems to us that there 
remains a risk of slippage into chaos because of the potentially imperfect legal 
regime for presidential succession.163 
What, though, of the risk of a military coup d’état against a sitting 
president?  A central bulwark against that eventuality is firm civilian control 
over the military.  The Constitution here speaks with more clarity.  A 
civilian president is “Commander in Chief.”164  His or her policy-making 
authority, moreover, has historically been understood to be hedged around by 
Congress’ Article I authorities to enact military legislation.165  As a result, absent 
  
161. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law 
Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1995). 
162. See William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Realities of Presidential Succession: 
“The Emperor Has No Clones”, 75 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1444–45 (1987) (describing such a 
conflict). 
163. What if Congress were subject to substantial disabling casualties?  Article I, sections 2 
and 3, vest authority at the state level to replace representatives and Senators by election 
and temporary appointment respectively.  This diffuses the power to manage a legislative 
succession to geographically diffuse seats of governmental power.  These are unlikely to 
all be simultaneously disrupted, but it is not hard to imagine that the process of 
reselecting federal legislators would take considerable time, creating a hazardous gap in 
federal decisional authority. 
164. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy 
of the United States . . . .”).  The U.S. Supreme Court has viewed this clause as the locus of 
civilian control.  See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974) (“The military establishment is 
subject to the control of the civilian Commander in Chief and the civilian departmental 
heads under him, and its function is to carry out the policies made by those civilian 
superiors.”). 
165. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 6, 8.  On the historical record, see Saikrishna Bangalore 
Prakash, The Separation and Overlap of War and Military Powers, 87 TEX. L. REV. 299, 303 
(2008), which states: “[There is a] vast body of legislation regulating how the Commander in 
Chief could (and could not) use the military.  In the face of these laws, early Commanders in 
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some extraordinary (and historically unsupported) claim that the president 
stands above the statutory law when it comes to the military, the Constitution 
not only speaks against military usurpation but also presidential deployment 
of the military as an instrument of political aggrandizement.166 
We think that those risks still obtain today, especially in the wake of 
an exogenous shock such as a natural disaster or a violent attack, albeit in 
a weaker form than at the Founding.167  Yet it is striking that the forms of 
military intervention in civilian political decisionmaking that concern 
contemporary commentators do not rise to anywhere near the level of an 
authoritarian reversion.  Instead, they concern retail interventions, 
typically on matters that relate to the military’s operation and missions.168  
That is, the current pattern and practice of behavior by military officials—and 
in particular the small-bore nature of their interventions into the civilian 
democratic process—are not consistent with the assumption of an armed 
force champing at the bit of civilian control, and seeking to usurp such 
control. 
One reason to think that risk of a coup against the president is small 
relates to the very organization of the armed forces, which is divided into 
services in intense competition with each other in a manner that increases 
the coordination costs that would be required to effectuate a coup d’état.169  
In addition, the continued ability of the President to manipulate the chain 
of command through the use of promotions, reassignments, and even 
  
Chief saluted smartly, consistently deferring to Congress and never doubting the 
constitutionality of legislative micromanagement.” 
166. This corresponds to the policy concerns that were most salient at the time of the Founding.  
See David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 527 (2008) 
(describing the Framers as animated by a “fear of military coups, the countervailing fear of 
civilian abuse of military power, and concern about adventurism”). 
167. Id. at 532–33 (“Concerns about military interference with politics, presidential abuse of the 
commander in chief power, and military adventurism remain alive and well.”); see FEAVER, 
supra note 121, at 230. 
168. See Luban, supra note 166, at 534 (discussing on-the-record statements by officers that 
might have had a political effect); Pearlstein, supra note 123, at 799–800 (discussing military 
lawyers’ interventions on detention and interrogation policies during President George W. 
Bush’s time in office). 
169. The division into services originates in the National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80–
253, 61 Stat. 495 (1948) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).  Histories of the 
Act suggest that the division of the services is not an attempt to identify an optimal 
design, but the play of interests among bureaucratic factions capable of influencing 
Congress at the moment of enactment.  See AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC 57–62 (1999). 
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dismissals has not yet been called into question.170  On the other hand, as some 
commentators have noted with concern, it is also the case that the military’s 
involvement “across a broad spectrum of heretofore purely civilian 
activities” could lead to the penetration of military personnel into civilian 
life.171  To date, however, we see little evidence that that feared diffusion of 
military personnel has occurred, or even that it is actively sought by any 
powerful interest group.  Furthermore, to reiterate a point made above, the 
relatively unconstrained nature of executive power to respond to emergencies 
undermines the argument made in other countries that “only the military” is 
able to govern effectively in crisis.   
At the same time, the chain of command should not be fetishized.  
Consider the possibility of an elected civilian president who is willing to use 
the military as a tool of repression, or is willing to defer completely to 
military commanders.  In such a circumstance, in which there is perfect 
alignment between the president and the military, the effects will be exactly 
the same as if there were actual military rule.  As has been observed in the 
context of the separation of powers between Congress and the executive, 
structural constitutional constraints may be less effective when preferences 
are aligned across institutions.172  Unlike the interbranch context, however, 
there is no obvious mediating mechanism analogous to a political party that 
can align presidential and military interests.  To the contrary, there is some 
evidence of strong historical connections between Congress and the 
military, based on shared interests in localized spending on military 
installations.173  Such convergent interests might cut against the prospect of 
  
170. Rosa Brooks, Obama vs. the Generals, POLITICO MAG. (Nov. 2013), http://www.politico.com 
/magazine/story/2013/11/obama-vs-the-generals-099379 [https://perma.cc/J7QT-5Q3P]. 
171. Dunlap, supra note 113, at 112.  In another work, Dunlap worries that the military will come 
to be seen as a “deliverer” that can solve “economic and social problems [that] stubbornly 
defy civilian solution.”  Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian 
Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 357 (1994). 
172. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2312–16 (2006) (discussing interest convergence across 
institutions). 
173. See REBECCA U. THORPE, THE AMERICAN WARFARE STATE: THE DOMESTIC POLITICS 
OF MILITARY SPENDING 5–6 (2014) (describing close linkages between legislators 
and the military based on shared interests in military spending).  Congress, 
however, at times mandates spending on projects and capabilities that the military 
resists as functionally obsolete.  Walter Pincus, It Appears From the Hill That the 
Military Has Money to Spare, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2012, at A19.  The military’s 
inability to resist such proposals points to a deeper lack of political capacity on its 
part.  Cf. Kaija Schilde, War Powers, Private Actors, and National Security State 
Capacity, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1369, 1380 (2015) (“If the executive of a state wants to 
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a presidential-military alliance to subvert or suspend democratic 
institutions. 
4. Summary 
In short, while some fear authoritarian reversion in the United States, we 
conclude that there is only a small risk of such a development.  In the next 
section we introduce a different modality, constitutional retrogression, and 
suggest that a rather different pattern obtains in that context. 
Without anticipating the arguments developed below, it is worth 
underscoring a point about the coexistence of the two mechanisms that we have 
identified.  To the extent that a political actor wishes to derogate from 
democracy, and there are two pathways open to her, the fact that one has lower 
attendant transaction costs will make the other trajectory comparatively less 
attractive.  An easier path, that is, makes the hard road less desirable.  A 
dynamic of this sort may well be at work in the interaction of authoritarian 
reversion and constitutional retrogression: If the latter turns out to enable 
much the same result at a substantially lower cost, then it would be 
unsurprising if it crowded out authoritarian reversion.  Hence, the potentiality 
of the mechanism discussed in Part III below is salient too in the development 
of an explanation of why the risk of American authoritarian reversion now 
seems relatively small. 
III. THE EMERGING THREAT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RETROGRESSION 
Not every wolf bares its teeth and claws, or stands outside the door 
growling for blood.  Some threats to constitutional liberal democracies do not 
announce themselves, and are all the more dangerous for it.  This Part 
explores the risk to democracy from slow, incremental, and endogenous decay 
as opposed to the rapid external shock of a coup or an emergency 
declaration.  Constitutional retrogression, as we have defined it, involves a 
simultaneous decay in three institutional predicates of democracy: the 
quality of elections, speech and associational rights, and the rule of law.  In 
our view, it is retrogression, rather than reversion, that poses the greatest 
risk to democracy in the U.S. context. 
We begin this Part by demonstrating that retrogression is the modal 
species of democratic recession across Latin America, Eastern Europe and 
  
change the status quo by enacting and enforcing a policy choice and it cannot do 
so, then, through a comparative politics lens, we say that state lacks capacity.”). 
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Russia, and Asia.  Drawing on comparative law and politics analysis of these 
cases, we then extract five specific mechanisms by which constitutional 
retrogression unfolds.  These are: (i) constitutional amendment; (ii) the 
elimination of institutional checks; (iii) the centralization and politicization of 
executive power; (iv) the contraction or distortion of a shared public sphere; 
and (v) the elimination of political competition. 
Our final contribution in this Part is to examine the role of the U.S. 
Constitution in either parrying or exacerbating these five threats.  To avoid 
endogeneity concerns, we focus on relatively durable elements of 
constitutional structure and rights, as well as gaps in the text and doctrine that 
interact with the observed mechanisms of constitutional retrogression.  We do 
not, that is, simply assume the existence of constitutional rules that an 
antidemocratic leader might induce as a means of facilitating their large 
political project.  This analysis yields a mixed evaluation, with some elements 
of the current constitutional dispensation generating friction and some 
enabling incrementalist backsliding. 
A. The Global Diffusion of Constitutional Retrogression 
Constitutional retrogression is best understood as a partial substitute 
for authoritarian reversion.  The incremental erosion of liberal 
democracy’s institutional and social premises typically yields forms of 
concentrated state power immune from democratic oversight.  The degree of 
concentration or immunity from democratic control, though, may be less than 
would be achieved through a coup or an emergency declaration.174  But in 
expectation, constitutional retrogression may also be a more attractive path 
away from democracy because it attracts less resistance.  Simply put, it is 
less costly to observe and evaluate a single rupture from democratic practice 
than it is to observe and evaluate the aggregate effect of many incremental 
cuts into democratic, liberal, and constitutional norms.  Because no 
democratic system is perfect, there will always be some quanta of such violations.  
The precise point, however, at which the volume of democratic and 
constitutional backsliding amounts to constitutional retrogression will be 
unclear—both ex ante and contemporaneously.175  We do not attempt to 
  
174. Cf. Bermeo, supra note 70, at 6 (“Backsliding can take us to different endpoints at different 
speeds.”). 
175. This is the case with vague concepts generally.  See Hyde, supra note 84 at 7 
(noting the difference between the possibility that “[n]othing can be known” about 
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quantify what in all events is a matter of contextualized and normatively 
freighted judgment.  
At the same time, backsliding may involve the decay of liberal democratic 
institutions into “fluid and ill-defined” arrangements, a condition in which 
uncertainty over both diagnosis and remedies is rampant.176  Under such 
circumstances, there will be no crisp focal point that can supply diffuse social 
and political actors with a coordinating signal that democratic norms are 
imperiled.177  The absence of a focal point will render popular and 
oppositional resistance to the antidemocratic consolidation of political power 
more costly and less effective.  In short, it is precisely because it does not come 
dressed as a wolf that the threat of constitutional retrogression is so grave.  Or 
consider another animal metaphor: Like the apocryphal frog placed in slowly 
boiling water, a democratic society in the midst of retrogression may not realize 
its predicament until matters are already beyond redress. 
Given these dynamics, it is unsurprising that constitutional retrogression 
has come to dominate authoritarian reversion as the antidemocrat’s instrument 
of choice.  In sheer numbers, more countries have suffered declines in 
democratic quality than have undergone some form of democratic collapse.178  
Scholars of comparative politics have been observing incremental 
retrogression in a wide range of countries, including Hungary, Poland, 
Russia, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, and many others.179 
The trend may be accelerating.  As we have noted, Erdmann’s study of 
democratic trends between 1974 and 2008, for example, identified fifty-two 
instances in which a democracy shifted either to a “hybrid” or an 
“authoritarian” regime.180  In forty-eight of these, the shift away from 
democracy was not absolute, but incremental and subtle; it has happened “in 
  
vague concepts, and rejecting that possibility in favour of the less skeptical view 
that only “[t]he precise boundaries to knowledge itself cannot be known”).  
176. Bermeo, supra note 70, at 6. 
177. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–55 (1960) (describing 
operation of focal points under conditions of multiple equilibria); John M. Carey, 
Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 735, 749 (2000) 
(describing constitutional text as providing a focal point for coordination); Weingast, 
supra note 45, at 251–52 (coordination for constitutional enforcement). 
178. Erdmann, supra note 100, at 34–35; see also Larry Diamond & Leonardo Morlino, The 
Quality of Democracy, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 2004, at 20. 
179. See Levitsky & Way, supra note 13. 
180. Erdmann, supra note 100, at 26–35.  Erdmann uses Freedom House categories, drawing 
on their ordinal scale.  “Free” countries are those with a score of 1.0 to 2.5 on the index; 
“partly free” countries have scores from 3.0 to 5.0, and count as hybrid regimes; and “not 
free” autocracies have scores of 5.5 to 7.0.  Id. at 25. 
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many different ways and for many different reasons.”181  Salient to our inquiry 
here, the regularities that characterize authoritarian reversion—its correlation 
with younger and lower-income democracies182—do not hold with respect 
to constitutional retrogression.  Older democracies (such as India and 
Venezuela) and high-income countries experience substantial losses in 
democratic quality, even though they do not experience authoritarian 
reversions.183  A half dozen of Erdmann’s cases were high-income 
countries that backslid into hybrid regimes.184  Moreover, as a historical 
matter, the United States has not proven immune from such backsliding, 
even if it has not and will not collapse into authoritarianism.  Indeed, by 
the commonly used Polity measure, the United States suffered a decline 
in its democratic performance from 1850 through 1870.185 
Although it is hard to rigorously quantify the frequency of 
constitutional retrogression, one crude proxy is declines in the level of 
democracy, as measured by the Polity database.  Table 2 records all 
instances in which a democracy (measured by Polity scores of 6 and 
above) suffered a decline of quality, without experiencing total collapse.  
We measure the Polity score five years after the drop.  If it falls into the 
range associated with autocracy (less than -5 on the polity scale), we 
discard the observation.  This excludes all reversions.  But it also means 
the estimate of retrogressions will be a lower bound.  When two or more 
drops occur within a span of a decade, we aggregate them.  Using this 
metric, we can identify thirty-seven substantial declines in the quality of 
democracy in twenty-five different countries.  This suggests that roughly 
one out of eight countries will, in its lifespan, experience a meaningful 
decline in the quality of its democracy.  Even though many of these 
polities remain democratic, they have undergone a process of what we call 
constitutional retrogression—for as we have stressed, the process of 
retrogression need not always end in authoritarian or partly authoritarian 
rule. 
 
  
181. Id. at 26; accord LUST & WALDNER, supra note 17, at 5 (“[T]he vast majority of declines in the 
level of civil and political liberties are intra-regime changes.”). 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 103–111. 
183. Erdmann, supra note 100, at 34; cf. Alemán & Yang, supra note 70, at 1137 (“On the 
other hand, by far the best guarantor of democratic stability is a high level of 
economic development . . . .”). 
184. Erdmann, supra note 100, at 33 (describing incidence of democratic breakdown by 
economic situation in a country). 
185. Data collected in December 2016 to January 2017 and on file with authors. 
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TABLE 2.  Democratic Declines186 
Country (year(s)) Polity scoreat outset
Polity score
at end
Extent of 
retrogression 
Argentina (1989) 8 7 -1 
Belgium (2007) 10 8 -2 
Bolivia (2003–09) 9 7 -2 
Colombia (1995) 9 7 -2 
Czechoslovakia (1918) 10 7 -3 
Czech Republic (2006) 10 9 -1 
Ecuador (1984) 9 8 -1 
Ecuador (2000) 9 6 -3 
Gambia (1981) 8 7 -1 
Georgia (2007) 7 6 -1 
India (1950) 10 9 -1 
India (1975) 9 7 -2 
Ireland (1921) 9 8 -1 
Ireland (1933) 10 8 -2 
Israel (1967) 10 9 -1 
Israel (1981) 9 6 -3 
Jamaica (1993) 10 9 -1 
Kenya (2007) 8 7 -1 
Madagascar (1997–98) 9 7 -2 
Mali (1997) 7 5 -2 
Nigeria (1960) 9 8 -1 
Paraguay (1998) 7 6 -1 
Senegal (2007) 8 7 -1 
Solomon Islands (1978) 10 7 -3 
Somalia (1960) 8 7 -1 
Sri Lanka (1948) 10 7 -3 
Sri Lanka (1978) 8 6 -2 
Sri Lanka (2008–10) 6 4 -2 
Turkey (1965) 9 8 -1 
  
186. Data in Table 2 was collected for analysis in January 2017 from the Polity database.  See the 
main text for more details of the calculations involved. 
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Country (year(s)) Polity scoreat outset
Polity score
at end
Extent of 
retrogression 
Turkey (1993–97) 9 7 -2 
Ukraine (1991) 10 6 -4 
Ukraine (2000) 7 6 -1 
Ukraine (2010–14) 7 5 -2 
United States (1850–54) 10 8 -2 
Venezuela (1992) 9 8 -1 
Venezuela (1999–2001) 8 6 -2 
Venezuela (2004–09) 6 1 -5 
 
These examples share an end-state with various labels: electoral 
authoritarianism, competitive authoritarianism,187 illiberal democracy,188 semi-
democracy, and hybrid regime.189  Whatever the label, the concept is at its core 
the same: regimes that use constitutional and democratic forms but are not 
close to fully democratic.190  Whereas earlier authoritarian waves in Africa and 
Latin America took the form of military coups or revolutionary socialist 
regimes, the current wave of authoritarianism is strategic and sophisticated in 
its use of the democratic form.  All are notionally governed under a constitution 
and according to the dictates of law.  But rulers manipulate the law to reflect 
their interests, undermining the substance of democracy, albeit without losing 
its form.  Even though most or even all of the individual steps are taken within 
constitutional limits, in the aggregate they yield qualitative changes in the legal 
and political systems.191 
One way to capture the current extent of retrogression is to compare 
the number of jurisdictions that have seen advances as opposed to declines 
in the quality of their democracy.  As Figure 2 demonstrates, they tend to 
move in lockstep, albeit in different directions: When some countries 
deepen their democracy, others regress.  In recent years, there has been an 
uptick in both phenomena, suggesting that retrogression is at work in some 
countries, but not all. 
 
  
187. See Levitsky & Way, supra note 13, at 45 (coining the term “competitive authoritarianism”). 
188. See Zakaria, supra note 79 (discussing “illiberal democracy”). 
189. See Tushnet, supra note 39, at 395 (describing some regimes as hybrids). 
190. See JASON BROWNLEE, AUTHORITARIANISM IN AN AGE OF DEMOCRATIZATION (2007). 
191. Scheppele, supra note 82, at 560 (“When perfectly legal and reasonable constitutional 
components are stitched together to create a monster . . .  I call this a Frankenstate.”). 
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FIGURE 2.  Democratic Declines and Advances192 
 
 
In short, the global rise of constitutional retrogression suggests that 
“focusing on the military and on classic coup politics as privileged objects of 
research may be morally, politically, and empirically questionable.”193  We thus 
turn now to comparative experience with constitutional retrogression to better 
understand its specific institutional pathways and instruments. 
B. Pathways of Constitutional Retrogression 
This section maps five pathways of constitutional retrogression: (i) 
constitutional amendment; (ii) the elimination of institutional checks; (iii) the 
centralization and politicization of executive power; (iv) the contraction of the 
public sphere; and (v) the elimination of political competition.  In each 
instance, we supply examples from recent case studies.  Our aim in so doing is 
to develop a clear understanding of the specific elements of constitutional 
design that either exacerbate or mitigate the risk of such democratic 
backsliding before applying this learning to the U.S. case. 
  
192. Produced in January 2017 by authors with data from Freedom House.  See generally 
FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 74. 
193. Schedler, supra note 101, at 95. 
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1. Formal Constitutional Amendment 
The first and perhaps most obviously available pathway to democratic 
erosion involves the use of formal constitutional amendment as a tool to 
disadvantage or marginalize political opposition and deliberative pluralism.194  
Amendment of a constitution’s formal text can target institutional structures or 
liberal rights;195 as such, it overlaps with the four functional other pathways of 
constitutional retrogression described below.  We agree, however, with David 
Landau that the typically distinctive nature of constitutions makes their 
amendment a unique avenue of democratic backsliding that warrants separate 
treatment.196 
Perhaps the most straightforward use of constitutional amendments for 
anti-democratic ends concerns the alteration of term limits designed to 
forestall individuals’ entrenchment in positions of supreme authority.  For 
example, President Vladimir Putin, when confronted with a term limit that 
would put him out of office, simply arranged for a constitutional 
amendment to strengthen the powers of the prime minister, an office he 
duly occupied for a term before resuming the presidency.197  Sri Lanka’s 
President Mahindra Rajapaksa engineered a constitutional amendment in 
2010 to allow himself the chance to run again in 2016, while aggregating 
appointment power that had previously been dispersed among independent 
commissions.198  Similar dissolutions of constitutional term limits are observed 
from Azerbaijan to Uganda.199  Whereas in an earlier era, simply ignoring the 
constitution was a typical way of proceeding, since 1989, more than seventy-
  
194. See Landau, supra note 65, at 191 (“[T]he use of constitutional tools to create authoritarian 
and semi-authoritarian regimes is increasingly prevalent.”). 
195. See id. at 196 (noting that anti-democratic constitutional amendments typically 
concern: “(1) the electoral sphere and the extent to which incumbent and opposition 
figures compete on a level playing field, and (2) the extent to which the rights of 
individuals and minority groups are protected”). 
196. Id. at 191. 
197. Ginsburg et al., supra note 68, at 1812 (“Vladimir Putin opted to step down from the 
Russian presidency in favor of an informally empowered prime ministership, which 
provided him with an unlimited tenure, or at least one at the mercy of a sympathetic 
legislature controlled by his party.”). 
198. See CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA Sep. 9, 2010, 
amend. 18. 
199. Ginsburg, et al., supra note 68, at 1811–12. 
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five percent of attempts at term limit extension proceed through constitutional 
amendment.200 
Constitutional amendments can also be used to accomplish the other four 
modes of retrogression.  In Hungary, Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party 
exploited a brief supermajority, abetted by serious seat-vote bias in the electoral 
system, to adopt a new constitution in 2011 that entrenched the Fidesz party’s 
position in power.201  Constitutional changes altered the composition and 
operation of the Constitutional Court, created a new National Judicial Office, 
and strengthened government power over the Electoral Commission, Budget 
Commission, and Media Board.202  In this instance, constitutional amendment 
was employed alongside a number of subconstitutional mechanisms—an 
illustration of the complementarity of diverse antidemocratic tools. 
2. The Elimination of Institutional Checks 
The practice of liberal democracy requires a measure of institutional 
heterogeneity within government.  Concentration of authority within the state 
lowers the cost of misuses of power and law violations.  Although modern 
scholars are skeptical about the most ambitious claims on behalf of institutional 
separation between branches of government,203 it remains the case that 
legislatures and constitutional courts have the capacity to play a restraining 
function, slowing the centralization of state authority and the closing of 
democratic space.  Drawing on examples from Mongolia, Bulgaria, and 
Ukraine, for example, Samuel Issacharoff has documented “the distinct role of 
constitutional courts in maintaining the vibrant competitiveness of new 
democracies.”204  The “antiparliamentary” turn of the Weimar chancellorship 
after the 1932 fall of Heinrich Brüning presaged and catalyzed the collapse 
of constitutional democracy in the wake of a period of effective legislative 
  
200. This is from data gathered in 2010–11 on file with authors, which draws on Ginsburg, et 
al., supra note 68.  Thirty-six percent of pre-1990 attempts at term limit evasion used 
amendment, whereas seventy-five percent of those thereafter do so. 
201. Landau, supra note 65, at 209 (noting that the amendments “undermin[e] horizontal 
checks on the majority and may help it to perpetuate itself in power indefinitely”); see also 
Miklós Bánkuti et al., Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Disabling the Constitution, J. DEMOCRACY, 
July 2012, at 138. 
202. See Landau, supra note 65, at 209–10. 
203. See, e.g., Levinson & Pildes, supra note 172, at 2312–16. 
204. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: CONTESTED POWER IN THE ERA OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 200 (2015); accord Bugarič & Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 
71. 
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constraint of the presidency.205  Institutional capacity, it is worth emphasizing, 
does not entail institutional will.  Weimar courts, for example, never exercised 
an effective restraining force on post-1932 presidential aggrandizement.206  
But in the absence of either de facto or de jure incentive gaps between 
different branches of government, there is no chance of a frictional 
constraint emerging from constitutional structure to check democratic 
backsliding. 
Recent case studies of constitutional retrogression provide a number of 
instances in which interbranch checks have been deliberately and 
systematically dismantled.  Eastern Europe provides particularly vivid 
examples.  In addition to seeking constitutional amendments, the Hungarian 
government also used legislation to weaken the courts and narrow the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction.207  It also expanded the number of judges 
on that bench, and then more generally used appointment powers to pack 
the independent oversight institutions meant to ensure the rule of law. 
In Poland, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) won both presidential and 
parliamentary (Sejm) elections in 2015.  Unlike its counterpart in Hungary, it 
lacked a sufficient majority to amend the Constitution.  Nevertheless, it was 
able to manipulate institutions to its benefit, launching “a frontal assault” on 
the Constitutional Tribunal.208  It was helped, in part, by the outgoing 
legislative majority, which, the June before the elections, passed a new 
Constitutional Court Act that, inter alia, sought to accelerate appointments to 
five impending vacancies on the Constitutional Court.209  Yet, after the 
elections, the new PiS President refused to seat the newly appointed judges on 
the ground that the law was unconstitutional.  This created ambiguity about 
the status and composition of the Court.  The PiS then amended the 
Constitutional Court Act, allowing for the Sejm to appoint new justices, and 
also declared the prior appointments invalid.210  Further amendments in 
December 2015 required that all cases be decided by the plenary bench of the 
Court, that decisions be taken by a two-thirds vote, and that thirteen out of 
  
205. Lindseth, supra note 61, at 1363. 
206. Karl Loewenstein, Law in the Third Reich, 45 YALE L.J. 779, 788 (1936). 
207. See Bugarič & Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 73 (enumerating legislated changes). 
208. Joanna Fomina & Jacek Kucharczyk, Populism and Protest in Poland, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 
2016, at 58, 62–63. 
209. See Lech Garlicki, Die Ausschaltung des Verfassungsgerichtshofes in Polen? (Disabling the 
Constitutional Court in Poland), in TRANSFORMATION OF LAW SYSTEMS IN CENTRAL, EASTERN 
AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE IN 1989–2015, at 63, 65 (Andrzej Szmyt & Boguslaw Banaszak 
eds., 2016). 
210. Id. at 67. 
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fifteen judges be present to form a quorum.  Since fewer than thirteen judges 
had unambiguous appointment status, this meant that the Court would be 
unable to render any valid decisions.  Furthermore, the amendments 
required the Court to hear cases in the sequence in which they arrived at the 
Court, so no priority could be given to urgent cases.  The Court thus faced a 
crisis of personnel and procedure: Should it accept the amendments, it would 
be unable to hear a challenge to the very law disabling it.211  In response, the 
Court struck down the amendments in March 2016.212  The government, in 
turn, announced that it would ignore this ruling, which it declined to publish 
in the official gazette.213  As the honorary speaker of parliament said, “it is the 
will of the people, not the law that matters, and the will of the people always 
tramples the law.”214 
The procedural sophistication of the PiS shows how, even operating 
within normal constitutional rules, a determined actor can paralyze and 
undermine safeguards of legality.  While Europe’s institutions expressed 
concern about the erosion of the rule of law, the PiS’s and Fidesz’s observance 
of formal legality allowed both to remain within the broad framework of 
European governance.215 
3. Centralizing and Politicizing Executive Power 
Effective constraints on self-dealing by elected officials to entrench 
themselves in office can emerge from within the executive branch, as much as 
from outside it.  Of necessity, modern executive branches are plural, and 
potentially pluralist, institutions.216  The design of specific subelements or 
  
211. Id. at 71–72. 
212. Bugarič & Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 74. 
213. Id. 
214. TAMAS GYORFI, AGAINST THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 62–63 (2016) (quoting Tomasz 
Tadeusz Koncewicz, Polish Constitutional Drama: Of Courts, Democracy, Constitutional 
Shenanigans and Constitutional Self-Defense, I·CONNECT (Dec. 6, 2015), 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/12/polish-constitutional-drama-of-courts-democracy-
constitutional-shenanigans-and-constitutional-self-defense [https://perma.cc/PCH3-
826V]). 
215. See Marco Dani, The “Partisan Constitution” and the Corrosion of European Constitutional 
Culture 55–57 (London Sch. Econ. & Pol. Sci., LEQS Paper No. 68/2013) (legalism a feature 
of EU law that ignores politics). 
216. For a discussion of this point in the American context, see Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. 
Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 352 
(2016), which states: “[The three branches of the federal government do not] 
operate as monoliths.  Rather, they are enveloped and infused by a teeming 
ecosystem of institutional, organizational, and individual actors within as well as 
outside of government.” 
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the interaction between those elements can either facilitate constitutional 
retrogression or retard it.  As a result, the internal ecosystem of institutional 
arrangements within the executive branch provides another site of potential 
incremental movement toward constitutional retrogression. 
A central feature of effective governance is autonomous bureaucratic 
capacity, insulated from political control at the day-to-day level.  Bureaucracies 
that “operate[] according to written rules and create[] stable expectations” 
have been an essential component of the powerful centralized state since the 
Chinese Qin dynasty.217  At first blush, the relationship between bureaucratic 
capacity and democratic preservation is hard to discern.  Indeed, it might be 
thought instead that effective bureaucratic operation requires a certain measure 
of insulation from redistributive politics: That is, where bureaucratic positions 
and favors are allocated on the basis of political connections, there is no 
particular reason to expect effective government.  In the late nineteenth century, 
for example, the U.S. federal government was characterized by a high degree of 
“party-managed clientelism,” constantly at risk of evolving into “pure 
corruption.”218  As a result, “democracy and state quality were clearly at 
odds.”219 
But bureaucratic autonomy does not only stand in tension with 
democratic impulses.  It also facilitates and preserves democracy in three 
distinct ways.  First, early bureaucracies from the Chinese to the Prussian 
model evolved formal rules that restricted state power, for example by “clearly 
establish[ing] the boundary between private and public resources.”220  Even 
the Chinese emperor, typically depicted as the embodiment of “[o]riental 
[d]espotism,” was in fact highly constrained by the system of rules in which 
the state operated.221  Bureaucracies are thus institutionally pivotal barriers to 
the misuse of state power either for the private gain of officials or for the 
electoral gain of a ruling faction.  It is this basic insight that underwrites the 
growing literature on the “internal separation of powers” in American 
administrative law.  Of particular importance in this regard is the role of 
  
217. FUKUYAMA, supra note 95, at 75. 
218. Id. at 144, 148. 
219. Francis Fukuyama, Why Is Democracy Performing so Poorly?, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2015, at 
11, 17. 
220. FUKUYAMA, supra note 95, at 83–84. 
221. KARL WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER 33–34 
(1957) (discussing emergence of Chinese empire). 
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“various professionals—lawyers, scientists, civil servants, politicians, and 
others” who are “directly and indirectly” empowered.222 
Second, bureaucracies tend to be conservative, even Burkean, 
institutions.  This quality both hinders rapid democratic change and makes 
democratic decisionmaking feasible by preserving decisions beyond the life 
of the enacting coalition.  The bias toward the status quo is symmetric: Just as 
bureaucratism may make progressive reform difficult to achieve, it also slows 
down rapid shifts away from liberal democratic norms in the face of political 
movements that seek to challenge them. 
Third, in the absence of an effective bureaucracy, a potential 
antidemocrat can use a patronage-based state structure to “buy support 
from political elites and citizens” in ways that undermine the efficacy of 
electoral mechanisms.223  Distinguishing normatively troubling clientelism—
the “larger-scale exchange of favors between patrons and clients [via] a hierarchy 
of intermediaries”224—and appropriate democratic responsiveness in the 
form of pork-barreling and mundane interest-group politics presents difficult 
line-drawing questions.  But in the case where state resources have the 
practical effect of creating high or insuperable hurdles to electoral rotation, 
then it seems plausible to view patronage as an instrument of constitutional 
retrogression.  In contrast, it has long been noted that a meritocratically-
selected bureaucracy is in fact a vehicle for mobility and political representation 
of groups that might otherwise be shut out of politics.225  There is little doubt, 
for example, that the U.S. federal bureaucracy is more representative of the 
average American in socioeconomic and racial terms than, say, the elected 
Congress.226 
Across the various nations that have experienced constitutional 
retrogression in recent years, the power to appoint officials has been an 
instrument used to “neutraliz[e]” potentially resistant elements of government, 
“particularly the transparency and accountability agencies.”227  In Hungary, for 
example, Fidesz reorganized the Media Council, the Budget Counsel, the 
  
222. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 
1035 (2011). 
223. Dawn Brancati, Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects, 17 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
313, 317 (2014). 
224. FUKUYAMA, supra note 95, at 86. 
225. See Norton E. Long, Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 808 (1952); 
see also Ali Farazmand, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Theoretical Analysis, 10 PUB. ORG. 
REV. 245 (2010) (democracy requires bureaucracy). 
226. See Long, supra note 225, at 812–13. 
227. Scheppele, supra note 72, at 16. 
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National Bank, the Elections Commission, and the Ombudsman Office in 
moves that were “frequently accompanied by the removal of incumbent 
officials.”228  In the gaps that remained, Fidesz took “the existing patronage 
system” to an “extreme” such that only companies and individuals with 
connections to the ruling party could obtain contracts or support from the 
state.229 
Turkey provides another useful example of a country wherein a robust 
state apparatus is being systematically undermined.  The bureaucracy, along 
with the military and judiciary, have been the central institutions of the modern 
Turkish state.  Judicial reforms in Turkey under Recep Tayyib Erdogan’s 
leadership have vested the president with more control over those who would 
select the ordinary judges and prosecutors.  In the wake of an alleged coup 
attempt in July 2016, the Erdogan government purged or detained 9,000 police 
officers, 21,000 private school teachers, 10,000 soldiers, 2,745 judges, 1,570 
university deans, and 21,700 Ministry of Education officials.230  This is merely 
the overt form of a measure that tacitly occurs in the context of many 
constitutional retrogressions. 
4. Shrinking the Public Sphere 
The practical operation of liberal democracy requires a shared 
epistemic foundation.231  A central claim on behalf of democracy’s 
comparative advantage as a strategy of governance, inspired by the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem, is that larger pools of decisionmakers are more 
likely to reach empirically accurate decisions.232  Where information is 
  
228. Id. 
229. Zsolt Enyedi, Populist Polarization and Party System Institutionalization: The Role 
of Party Politics in De-Democratization, 63 PROBS. POST-COMMUNISM 210, 214 
(2016). 
230. See Josh Keller et al., The Scale of Turkey’s Purge Is Nearly Unprecedented, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/02/ 
world/europe/turkey-purge-erdogan-scale.html. 
231. See Elizabeth Anderson, The Epistemology of Democracy, 3 EPISTEME 8, 10 (2006) 
(“Epistemic democrats focus on the question of whether democratic institutions 
can be relied upon to make the right decisions, according to external criteria.”). 
232. For an early formulation of this position, see Bernard Grofman & Scott L. Feld, Rousseau’s 
General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567 (1988).  For criticism 
on this position, see Anderson, supra note 231, at 11–13.  The best recent defense of 
democracy as epistemically superior in comparison to oligopoly and dictatorship is 
Hélène Landemore, Democratic Reason: The Mechanisms of Collective Intelligence in 
Politics, in COLLECTIVE WISDOM: PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS 251, 282 (Hélène 
Landemore & Jon Elster eds., 2012), which states: “[T]he good thing about democracy is 
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systematically withheld or distorted by government so as to engender 
correlated, population-wide errors, democracy cannot fulfill this 
epistemic mandate. 
One need not rely on Condorcetian premises, however, to posit epistemic 
minima for effective constitutional liberal democracy.  It suffices to observe that 
democracy entails periodic electoral choices as to whether a specific coalition or 
official should maintain state authority.  Elections bring coalitions to power.  
Those coalitions then enact policies with consequences in the world.  
Subsequent polls at which those coalitions seek renewed democratic authority 
would seem to be a mere formality in the absence of information about the 
consequences of enacted measures.233  Elections must make “the elected an 
object of control and scrutiny.”234  Hence, a continuous flow of information 
about the interaction between government policies and external conditions 
seems to be a minimal prerequisite for democratic judgment.  To be sure, this 
epistemic foundation need not be flawless in coverage or quality.235  But at some 
point, epistemological failure can become so extensive and asymmetrically 
tilted in favor of one coalition or candidate that it starts to render the exercise 
of democratic choice futile.236 
To render this point more concrete, imagine a government that purports 
to foster public security by extensive use of detention powers targeting discrete 
minority populations.  The government fails to disclose that its policy is not 
based on evidence that the minority in question in fact includes a meaningful 
number of individuals who pose a security threat.  At the same time, it employs 
a divisive language of identity-based differences to both vindicate its policy and 
to raise political support among nonminority voters.237  The absence of accurate 
information about the government’s policy not only facilitates grave violations 
of individual rights, but it also allows the government to deploy those grave 
  
that it naturally economizes on individual intelligence, while maximizing through sheer 
numbers the key factor of cognitive diversity.” 
233. See Anderson, supra note 231, at 12 (“Democratic decision-making needs to recognize 
its own fallibility, and hence needs to institute feedback mechanisms by which it can 
learn how to devise better solutions and correct its course in light of new information 
about the consequences of policies.”). 
234. NADIA URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED: OPINION, TRUTH AND THE PEOPLE 21 (2014). 
235. Cf. JASON STANLEY, HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS 50 (2015) (“[L]iberal democratic vocabulary 
is often used propagandistically, in states whose practices fall too short of its ideals.”). 
236. Jason Stanley addresses the view that the United States may have already reached that 
threshold.  Id. at 13. 
237. This hypothetical is based on the internment of Japanese-Americans during World 
War II.  Joel B. Grossman, The Japanese American Cases and the Vagaries of 
Constitutional Adjudication in Wartime: An Institutional Perspective, 19 U. HAW. L. 
REV. 649, 651–57 (1997). 
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violations as a means of amplifying public support.  Incomplete information 
thus not only leads voters to erroneous judgments, it also allows government to 
promote exclusionary ideals and to eliminate dissenting minorities from the 
electorate. 
The recent retrenchment of democracy around the world provides 
concrete examples of how the shared epistemic foundation of democracy can 
be corroded.  In 2000, the Chávez government in Venezuela enacted a media 
law that gave the government free rein to suspend or revoke broadcasting 
licenses as “convenient.”238  Four years later, another statute barred the 
electronic transmission of material that could “foment anxiety in the public or 
disturb public order.”239  By 2014, the Chávez regime had undermined press 
pluralism in favor of a “communicational hegemony . . . in both print media and 
television.”240  In Turkey, a long campaign against journalists was accelerated 
through the postcoup closure of about 100 media outlets in July and August 
2016.241  Indeed, Turkey has of late become one of the most repressive and 
dangerous environments for journalists globally today.242  And in Sri Lanka, 
the former Rajapaksa government used the broad restrictions of the Official 
Secrets Act and the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act, including a prohibition 
on bringing the government into “contempt,” to suppress and intimidate 
journalists.243 
In Poland, the PiS enacted a media law in December 2015 that required all 
broadcasters to have a board controlled by the government and “sidelined” a 
constitutional body charged with ensuring media independence.244  It also 
“appointed a PiS spin doctor as president of public television” and purged 
“journalists and media workers suspected of lacking enthusiasm for the 
government’s political agenda.”245  Similarly, in Hungary, at the same time that 
the Constitution was amended, the Fidesz-dominated Parliament enacted 
  
238. Corrales, supra note 67, at 39. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. at 41. 
241. See Keller et al., supra note 230. 
242. See Media Freedom in Turkey: Sultanic Verses, ECONOMIST (Aug. 6, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21703375-turkish-governments-crackdown-
extends-journalists-and-poets-sultanic-verses [https://perma.cc/ZVK2-DK3J]. 
243. See Freedom of the Press 2015: Sri Lanka, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/sri-lanka [https://perma.cc/ SLM8-
MTL6]. 
244. Fomina & Kucharczyk, supra note 208, at 63. 
245. Id. 
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legislative measures narrowing the independence of media outlets.246  It also 
attacked independent universities, seeking to close the Central European 
University.247  Finally, in Russia, the Putin regime has harnessed the media to 
“gain insight into the fears and needs of particular groups,” and to create a 
simulacrum of democratic back-and-forth via call-in sessions chaired by the 
President himself.248 
Finally, an antidemocratic coalition or official can directly target the civil 
society elements—journalists, lawyers, NGOs, and foundations—that might 
mobilize to wrest movement away from liberal democratic ideals.249  Libel law 
and nonprofit regulation provide instruments to achieve these ends.250 
A recent suite of Russian legislation, enacted at the beginning of Putin’s 
second term in office in 2012, demonstrates how registration and libel laws can 
be wielded for antidemocratic ends.  Consider first libel law.  In May 2012, the 
Putin government reintroduced criminal liability for libel, which had been 
repealed by the Medvedev administration.251  This 2012 measure imposed 
large fines and sentences of up to 480 hours’ forced labor on “the spread of 
false information discrediting the honor and dignity of another person or 
undermining his reputation.”252  The law also allowed retroactive reopening of 
previously suspended or terminated suits.253  One commentator has described 
the subsequent use of the law as an “onslaught” of libel suits.254  Earlier 
  
246. See Judy Dempsey, Hungary Waves Off Criticism Over Media Law, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/world/europe/26hungary.html. 
247. Ben Chapman, George Soros’ Central European University Faces Closure After Hungary Law 
Targets Foreign Institutions, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 5, 2017, 9:45 AM), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/george-soros-central-european-
university-hungary-law-protests-foreign-institutions-parliament-a7667451.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y7XH-9SR6]. 
248. Brancati, supra note 223, at 316. 
249. See Tamir Moustafa, Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
281, 292 (2014). 
250. The selective enforcement of tax laws has also been used to control the media.  See TINA 
BURRETT, TELEVISION AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA 43–44 (2011) 
(describing criminal prosecution of Vladimir Gusinsky for fraudulently withholding $10 
million from the government in connection with a privatization deal after Gusinsky’s 
television channel criticized Putin over the Chechen war); Andrew S. Bowen, How Putin 
Uses Money Laundering Charges to Control His Opponents, ATLANTIC (July 17, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2013/07/how-putin-uses-money-
laundering-charges-to-control-his-opponents/277903 [https://perma.cc/C57Z-KGZP]. 
251. See Varol, supra note 69, at 1696. 
252. Thomas M. Callahan, Note, The Right to Reputation and the Case for Boris Nemtsov, 39 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1289, 1315 (2016) (quoting and translating the 2012 law). 
253. See Varol, supra note 69, at 1696. 
254. Id. at 1697.  Turkey’s leadership has used libel law in a similar fashion.  See Tim Arango, In 
Scandal, Turkey’s Leaders May Be Losing Their Tight Grip on News Media, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
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iterations of the same measure had been employed by Russia’s regional 
governments to fine and imprison journalists who published stories about 
waste and abuse.255 
A suite of NGO and “anti-extremist” laws also have been enacted under 
Putin with “deliberately ambiguous wording” and wielded in “an 
unprecedented campaign of reprisals against civil society.”256  Foreign-backed 
NGOs, in particular, have been subject to harsher scrutiny and restrictions on 
foreign funding.257  Under a 2012 law, such NGOs are required to register as 
foreign agents; provide quarterly reports on their activity, funding, and 
expenditures; and submit to surprise inspections.258  Many prominent NGOs 
have refused to comply with the measure, which was explicitly framed by its 
sponsors as an effort to undermine their credibility.259  But registration, 
though, is not the sole hurdle foreign-funded groups face.  Another related 
measure, an amendment to the treason statute also passed in 2012, treats 
dissemination of state secrets to foreign or multinational organizations (not 
just foreign governments) as a serious criminal offense.260  Such a measure 
directly impinges on the work of organizations that monitor abusive state 
action and state corruption.  Tellingly, the first entity to be charged with failing 
to register was Golos, a major election monitoring organization that revealed 
widespread voter fraud in 2011.261 
  
11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/world/europe/in-scandal-turkeys-leaders-
may-be-losing-their-tight-grip-on-news-media.html. 
255. See, e.g., Porubova v. Russia, App. No. 8237/03, at 1–5 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010) 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-94840 [https://perma.cc/7SW9-
SCT7] (appeal of eighteen-month criminal libel sentence levied on a journalist who 
published an article on corruption in a state railroad company). 
256. Shevtsova, supra note 73, at 30. 
257. See Darin Christensen & Jeremy M. Weinstein, Defunding Dissent: Restrictions on Aid to 
NGOs, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2013, at 77, 78. 
258. See Chip Pitts & Anastasia Ovsyannikova, Russia’s New Treason Statute, Anti-NGO and 
Other Repressive Laws: “Sovereign Democracy” or Renewed Autocracy?, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 
83, 121 (2015). 
259. Russian NGOs Refuse to Abide by Kremlin Law Ordering Some to Declare Themselves 
“Foreign Agents”, CBS NEWS (Sept. 28, 2012, 7:55 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/russian-ngos-refuse-to-abide-by-kremlin-law-ordering-
some-to-declare-themselves-foreign-agents [https://perma.cc/FH92-N42F]. 
260. Pitts & Ovsyannikova, supra note 258, at 114 (discussing the law and its enactment). 
261. Priyanka Boghani, Putin’s Legal Crackdown on Civil Society, PBS FRONTLINE (Jan. 13, 2015), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/putins-legal-crackdown-on-civil-society 
[https://perma.cc/9GDY-G4E7]; see also Charles Digges, Russian NGOs Undergoing 
Unprecedented Kremlin Sweeps, BELLONA (Apr. 2, 2013), http://bellona.org/news/russian-
human-rights-issues/russian-ngo-law/2013-04-russian-ngos-undergoing-unprecedented-
kremlin-sweeps [https://perma.cc/ZM3V-EAYC]. 
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The technology of restrictions on NGO funding and activities is diffusing 
and deepening.  In 2013, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Rights to Freedom of 
Peaceful Assembly and of Association noted that countries were exercising 
“increased control and undue restrictions” on civil society, in many cases to 
“silence the voices of dissent and critics.”262  Notwithstanding these concerns, 
more countries are adopting restrictions: In 2016, China passed a restrictive 
new NGO Law, and even a democracy like Israel is now requiring disclosure of 
foreign funding.263  Critics of the recent Israeli law argue that it is one-sided, 
designed to restrict funding for pro-Palestinian NGOs but not for settlements 
in the West Bank.264  Even if not so designed, selective enforcement of such laws 
would allow the state to shape the environment for public discourse.  Indeed, it 
is a common theme of the wave of recent restrictions on NGOs that they have 
particularly targeted human-rights NGOs.265  This illustrates the 
interdependence of the various mechanisms we have identified: By restricting 
the public sphere, governments undermine the liberal rights that are essential 
for genuine electoral competition to operate. 
The measures canvassed in this section narrow the public sphere, and 
undermine the existence of a shared high-quality epistemic basis available to all 
citizens for the evaluation of state actors’ behavior.  Specific tools may include a 
mix of civil and criminal legislation, administrative rules requiring ex ante 
registration, and ex post penalties through tax and regulatory enforcement.  
Some steps may simply be designed to demoralize and intimidate.  All, 
however, allow state actors either directly or indirectly to exclude or discredit 
news and news sources likely to report critically on incumbents’ behavior and 
its consequences.  This manipulation of the information environment not only 
extends existing arrangements of political power, it also undermines the very 
basis on which an open society operates. 
  
262. Maina Kiai (Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of 
Association), Second Rep. on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of 
Association, at 5, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/23/39 (Apr. 24, 2013), http://freeassembly.net/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/A.HRC_.23.39_EN-funding-report-April-2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4J53-VDB5]. 
263. Peter Beaumont, Israel Passes Law to Force NGOs to Reveal Foreign Funding, 
GUARDIAN (July 12, 2016, 4:12 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2016/jul/12/israel-passes-law-to-force-ngos-to-reveal-foreign-funding 
[https://perma.cc/6E74-6VKD]. 
264. Id. 
265. See generally THOMAS CAROTHERS & SASKIA BRECHENMACHER, CLOSING SPACE: DEMOCRACY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS SUPPORT UNDER FIRE (2014). 
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5. The Elimination of Political Competition 
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, democracy relies on the possibility of 
alternation in power.  At one extreme, entrenched one-party regimes cannot be 
ranked as proper democracies simply because they lack the electoral 
alternatives to facilitate a meaningful vote.  Where a meaningful opposition 
exists, though, an antidemocratic official or coalition has a range of options that 
maintain apparent conformity with the law yet limit its efficacy.  The libel and 
treason measures identified above form one element of this arsenal.266  But they 
hardly exhaust the available means to thwart and weaken democratic 
competition. 
Each of the national contexts we have mentioned has adopted a slightly 
different array of measures.  A mix of legislative measures, politicized law-
enforcement discretion, corruption, and (occasionally) outright violence is 
observed.  In Russia under Putin, for example, opposition parties have been 
legally proscribed for having too few members.267  Individual opposition 
activists are arrested for minor offenses such as “[c]rossing the road in an 
unauthorised place,” “[s]moking in a public space,” “[i]nfringement of road 
transport regulations by a pedestrian,” and “[d]runkenness.”268  Given this 
extensive array of options, it is rather surprising political assassination is ever 
needed in the Russia context (but it apparently is).269  In contrast, the 
Hungarian Fidesz party has used its legislative control over the electoral 
system to enact measures that increase the majoritarian bias in the 
electoral system.  For some time, Venezuelan elections, by contrast, have 
transpired in “an electoral environment plagued by irregularities and governed 
  
266. Political opponents of the Singaporean authorities, for example, have been subject 
to “substantial monetary penalties” as a consequence of libel judgments; because 
people with undischarged bankruptcies cannot run for office, libel law in the 
Southeast Asian city-state is doubly efficacious in suppressing political opposition.  
Tushnet, supra note 39, at 401–02. 
267. Luke Harding, Supreme Court Ban on Liberal Party Wipes Out Opposition to Putin, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2007, 7:58 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/mar/24/russia.lukeharding 
[https://perma.cc/9SRF-VWN3]. 
268. Alexandr Litoy, A Guide to Political Persecution in Russia, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Mar. 13, 
2015), https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/alexandr-litoy/guide-to-political-
persecution-in-russia [https://perma.cc/VB7T-AQYE]. 
269. In 2015, leading liberal opposition figure Boris Nemtsov was assassinated.  Uncontrolled 
Violence, ECONOMIST (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.economist.com/ news/europe/21645838-
assassination-boris-nemtsov-leaves-liberal-russians-fear-new-wave-violent 
[https://perma.cc/DBT7-TSYZ]. 
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by a biased regulatory agency.”270  In July 2017, the Maduro government held 
flawed elections for a constituent assembly to bypass the democratically 
elected legislature, leading some to assert the country was becoming a full-
blown dictatorship.271  And in Sri Lanka, the Rajapaksa regime was routinely 
accused of election fraud.272 
Even if the illiberal democrat happens to lose an election, she can find 
ways to avoid losing power.  For example, when opposition figure Antonio 
Ledezma won the mayoralty of Caracas in 2008, Chávez’s government created 
a new “capital district” and transferred most of the authority of the mayor’s 
office to the new entity.273  This entity was, of course, controlled by Chávez’s 
party.  (And, in a show of how sensitive that party is to the prospect of plausible 
democratic opposition, Ledezma was later arrested and held without charge 
for a year; as of August 2017, he was facing a criminal trial).274  Similarly, when 
the ruling party lost 2015 elections to the National Assembly, it created a new 
legislature, the “Communal Congress,” and sought to give it governing 
power.275  Ultimately, the regime’s courts have made the transfer of power 
unnecessary, as they constrain the legislature through the exercise of 
constitutional review. 
6. Conclusion 
The use of democratic, constitutional forms to achieve antidemocratic 
ends is nothing new.  But the antidemocrat’s toolkit has become increasingly 
sophisticated of late.  A careful review of available case studies reveals how the 
rough playbook for would-be illiberal democrats works in practice.  First, run a 
populist platform, in which the majority is portrayed as victims and the old 
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271. Sibylla Brodzinsky, Venezuela heading for dictatorship amid “Sham” Election, Warns US 
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order elitist.  Such was the strategy of, for example, Orbán in Hungary and 
Erdogan in Turkey.  Emphasize threats to national security or the purity of the 
homeland. 
Next, find ways to undermine opponents in state institutions, such as the 
judiciary or military.  Perhaps use the courts to repress criticism via libel suits or 
the like.  The electoral machinery is critical to ensure that future competition is 
limited.  Then, attack civil society as foreign-funded elite carriers of foreign 
ideas.  Ensure that the free media is intimidated, or diluted, so as not to provide 
an independent check.  The effect of these measures is cumulative; even if one 
alone is insufficient to raise concerns about constitutional retrogression, when 
sufficiently numerous they should be viewed with alarm. 
Table 3, below, summarizes these strategies for several prominent cases of 
backsliding.  In each case, save Sri Lanka, the program began with a populist 
election that brought to power hitherto weak interests.  Notably, these populists 
relied heavily on rural support and in some cases on malapportionment 
schemes that favored the countryside over urban voters.  In three of the cases 
(Venezuela, Hungary, and Sri Lanka), constitutional amendments were 
pursued that consolidated executive power and eliminated institutional 
roadblocks.  In the others, legislative or executive strategies were pursued to the 
same ends.  And all cases were accompanied by backsliding on liberal rights of 
speech and association, as well as efforts to shape public discourse through 
media restrictions or intimidation. 
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TABLE 3.  Modalities of Constitutional Backsliding 
in Comparative Context276 
Country Prehistory of leader 
Undermine 
institutional 
checks
Restrict 
electoral 
competition
Limit rights 
and restrict 
public sphere 
Venezuela 
1998–2015 
[Chávez-
Maduro] 
Failed coup 
attempt by 
Chávez in 
1992 
 abolish 
Congress and 
Supreme 
Court, and 
replace with 
1999 
Constitution 
 intimidate and 
pack judiciary 
and 
bureaucracy 
 reliance on 
military 
personnel and 
immediate 
family 
members
 secure 119/125 
seats in 1999 
constituent 
assembly 
 abolish term 
limits in 2009 
 detain 
opposition 
leader in 2013 
 undermine 
2008 Caracas 
election 
 significantly 
abuse 
criminal 
process 
 limit NGOs 
 revoke media 
licenses 
 nationalize 
television 
 censor press 
 criminalize 
“disrespect” 
of public 
officials 
Thailand 
2000–14 
[Shinawatra 
twice] 
Telecoms 
monopolist 
 bribe and pack 
watchdogs 
 manipulate tax 
law for 
personal gain 
 buy votes 
 influence over 
election 
commission 
 extrajudicial 
killings 
campaign 
 emergency 
rule in the 
South 
 media 
intimidation 
  
276. The data in this table was collected by the authors in 2016–17, and is based on country-
specific sources cited extensively in the footnotes elsewhere in this Article. 
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Country Prehistory of leader 
Undermine 
institutional 
checks
Restrict 
electoral 
competition
Limit rights 
and restrict 
public sphere 
Turkey 
2003–present 
[Erdogan] 
Jailed political 
party leader 
 attempt to 
pack the 
Courts in 2006
 purge of 
government, 
army, 
academia, and 
courts in 2016 
 intimidate 
constitutional 
court 
 local electoral 
fraud in 2009, 
2014 
 proposal to 
extend term 
limits with new 
constitution 
 mixed 
record—
abolish death 
penalty and 
expand 
voting rights; 
poor record 
on Kurdish 
issue 
 arrests of 
opponents 
 arrests and 
firings of 
journalists 
 seizure of 
newspapers 
and 
revocation of 
licenses 
Sri Lanka 
2005–15 
[Rajapaksa] 
MP 
 governing 
through 
relatives 
 centralize 
appointments, 
undermine 
civil service, 
and weaken 
independent 
bodies 
 impeach chief 
justice in 2013
 collusion with 
LTTE to block 
polls in 
Northeast 
 jail opponent 
in 2010 
election 
 abolish term 
limits in 
Constitution in 
2010 
 war crimes 
and impunity 
 takings of 
property in 
Northeast 
 abduction 
and murder 
of journalists 
 manipulation 
of GDP data 
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Country Prehistory of leader 
Undermine 
institutional 
checks
Restrict 
electoral 
competition
Limit rights 
and restrict 
public sphere 
Hungary 
2010–present 
[Orbán] 
MP 
 constitutional 
reform in 2011
 lower 
retirement age 
for judges in 
2011 
 in 2013, annul 
all 
constitutional 
court rulings 
before 2011 
 in 2014 
election, win 
sixty-seven 
percent seats 
with forty-four 
percent of 
votes 
 NGO 
restrictions 
 revisionist 
history 
curriculum 
 criminalize 
“imbalanced 
news 
coverage” 
and 
“insulting the 
majority” 
Poland 
2015 
[Kaczyński] 
Prime 
Minister 
 undermine 
constitutional 
court in 2015 
 control civil 
service
  take over 
state media 
from 
independent 
commission 
India 
1971–77 
[Gandhi] 
Scion;  
war with 
Pakistan over 
Bangladesh 
 abuse 
emergency 
power and rule 
by decree 
 manipulate 
courts after 
Kesavananda
 imprison 
political 
opponents 
 interfere with 
electoral 
machinery in 
1975
 mass arrests 
 repression of 
strikes 
 censorship 
 
It is worth emphasizing that not all of these efforts were completely 
successful in durably entrenching their proponents.  Thailand’s Thaksin was 
ousted in a coup in 2006, and has not been able to return to the country. 
Although his sister Yingluck established a government in 2011, she too was 
overthrown after proposing an amnesty that many suspected would have led to 
the return of her brother.277  Thailand is thus a case where constitutional 
retrogression led to a countervailing autocratic reversion.  In Venezuela, the 
  
277. See Sopranzetti, supra note 108, at 299–300; Thomas Fuller, Anger Erupts in Thailand Over 
Plans for Amnesty, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17 
/world/asia/possible-amnesty-for-former-thai-prime-minister-causes-uproar.html. 
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electoral machinery continued to function at least for a while, and allowed the 
opposition a victory in the National Assembly elections of 2015.  But this has 
not hindered the regime much yet—which itself is a sign of the concentration of 
power in the executive under Chávez and Maduro.  In a remarkable 
development in Sri Lanka in 2015, a member of Rajapaksa’s own party, 
Maithripala Srisena, won the presidency, largely out of disdain for the corrupt 
and autocratic rule of his predecessor.  Srisena then kept a campaign promise to 
push through a constitutional amendment effectively diluting his own power, 
and reverting toward a parliament-centered system such as the country had 
had until 1978.278  In a symbolic move, he reinstated a Chief Justice who had 
earlier been impeached by the Rajapaksa coalition.279 
Hence, shifts in the quality of constitutional democracy are not 
unidirectional or permanent.  Nevertheless, they do prove in many cases to be 
remarkably resilient, allowing some space for the opposition but not too much.  
The resulting style of authoritarian legality allows some genuine space for 
contestation, especially about issues that do not go to core regime interests.  
This in turn provides the regime with valuable information that may in fact 
extend its ability to govern, rather than undermine it.  We observe, for 
example, that authoritarians that adopt constitutions endure longer than 
those that do not.280  Those that “rule by law” are more stable than those that 
use purer forms of revolutionary action.  Legal rules may also facilitate making 
credible commitments in the economic sphere, and help the regime to 
coordinate its behavior internally.  Whatever its consequences, the spread of a 
constitutionalized mode of government in which the forms of democratic 
institutions are preserved but the substance undermined invites the question of 
whether the United States is indeed exceptional on this dimension. 
  
278. Sri Lanka Limits President’s Powers, TRT WORLD (Apr. 30, 2015), 
http://www.trtworld.com/asia/sri-lanka-limits-presidents-powers-309 
[https://perma.cc/8PMX-UZXL]; see also Asanga Welikala, The Rajapaksa Regime and the 
Constitutionalisation of Populist Authoritarianism in Sri Lanka, CONST. UNIT (Feb. 2, 2015), 
https://constitution-unit.com/2015/02/02/the-rajapaksa-regime-and-the-
constitutionalisation-of-populist-authoritarianism-in-sri-lanka [https://perma.cc/3LV5-
575P]. 
279. Tamil Sripavan Appointed Sri Lanka’s Top Judge, BBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31068699 [https://perma.cc/XT6K-ZXM3]. 
280. See Michael Albertus & Victor Menaldo, The Political Economy of Autocratic Constitutions, 
in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 53–82 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser 
eds., 2014). 
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C. Bringing Constitutional Retrogression Home 
Our analysis of the risk of constitutional retrogression in the current U.S. 
context tracks the pathways we have just identified.  We consider whether any 
of the five mechanisms of constitutional retrogression detailed in the previous 
section might have traction in the United States.  Our focus here is upon the 
durable institutional structures, seemingly entrenched rights, and textual gaps, 
and not the steps taken or proposed by the incumbent U.S. president in 2017: It 
is useful, in our view, to set forth crisply the interaction between extant 
constitutional rules and the threat of constitutional retrogression, without 
introducing potentially more contentious inquiries into a particular political 
figure. 
1. Constitutional Amendment 
Imagine that a political party had disciplined majorities in both houses of 
Congress and the thirty-eight states necessary to utilize Article V.  Or alternatively, 
suppose that the growing chorus of calls for a new constitutional convention 
yielded fruit.281  It would then be feasible to reform core elements of the American 
Constitution.  The content of such reforms is not hard to imagine.  Perhaps, 
following patterns in other illiberal democracies, a first target might be the 
Twenty-Second Amendment, which constitutionalized term limits in the wake of 
Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency.  Or simply examine the various liberty-restricting 
constitutional amendments that have been proposed in Congress over the years, 
mainly to overturn court decisions.282  To be sure, there are other amendments 
that have been proposed that would enhance liberty.  But the point is that there is 
nothing structural in Article V that prevents this disciplined national majority 
with sufficient political support at the state level from using constitutional 
amendment to entrench its power and restrict liberty. 
Nevertheless, we do not think that constitutional amendment will play a 
significant role in promoting the retrogression of constitutional liberal 
democracy for two reasons.  First, American political parties have historically 
lacked discipline relative to their counterparts in other democracies—a complex 
result of history, geography, and our electoral system.  And the very veneration of 
  
281. See Michael B. Rappaport, Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the National 
Convention Amendment Method and How to Fix Them, 96 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1515–17 (2010) 
(describing the amendment method used by the National Convention). 
282. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 180, 101st Cong. (1989) (proposing an amendment to prohibit flag 
burning). 
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the Constitution suggests that amendments are likely to receive a good deal of 
attention, working as focal points for constitutional resistance by regime 
opponents.283  As a strategic matter, more subtle mechanisms are likely to be 
more effective and hence more likely to be deployed.284 
Second, Article V of the Constitution establishes “some of the most 
onerous hurdles in the world for the ratification of amendments.”285  Indeed, it 
has been so rarely used that some scholars have argued that it has fallen into 
desuetude.286  In most other contexts in which amendment has played a large 
role in facilitating backsliding from democratic practices, by contrast, the 
amendment rule has been less demanding.287 
There is an irony here: Article V has been condemned roundly by 
commentators, especially on the political left.288  Yet the rigidity of the formal 
constitutional procedure largely takes off the table at least one potent 
instrument of constitutional retrogression at a moment when liberal 
commentators might well feel their priorities most imperiled. 
2. The Elimination of Institutional Checks 
The most likely motor of antidemocratic dynamics in the American 
political system is the presidency, acting with the acquiescence of a copartisan 
Congress.  Neither legislative chamber nor the courts possess the presidency’s 
  
283. Carey, supra note 177, at 753; Weingast, supra note 45, at 258. 
284. That said, there has been movement toward convening a constitutional convention, 
allegedly around the question of a balanced budget amendment.  America Might See a New 
Constitutional Convention in a Few Years, ECONOMIST (Sept. 30, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21729735-if-it-did-would-be-dangerous-thing-
america-might-see-new-constitutional-convention [https://perma.cc/TBG8-5ARY].  We 
think that such a convention would on balance be more harmful than beneficial; whether 
it would increase the risk of retrogression would depend on the political coalition holding 
the reins of national power when it happened. 
285. Rosalind Dixon, Partial Constitutional Amendments, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 643, 645–46 
(2011); accord ELKINS ET AL., supra note 138, at 65; Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of 
Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 362 (1994). 
286. See Richard Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V, 94 B.U. L. REV. 
1029, 1046 (2014). 
287. Landau, supra note 65, at 192 (“In countries outside of the United States, amendment 
thresholds are often set fairly low, allowing incumbents to round up sufficient support for 
sweeping changes with relative ease.  Even where amendment thresholds are set higher, 
incumbent regimes can reach requisite legislative supermajorities with surprising 
frequency.”). 
288. See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 319, 321; John 
Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1954 
(2003); Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is . . . Article V, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 173 
(1995).  But see Huq, supra note 22, at 1168 (offering a qualified defense of Article V). 
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“comparative institutional advantages in secrecy, force, and unity.”289  As in 
Hungary, Venezuela, and Russia, it is the executive, supported by an adjunct 
partisan formation in the legislature and the public sphere, that must be the 
focus of analysis.  The strength of interbranch checks, and in particular judicial 
frictions upon presidential authority, is a matter that has occasioned 
considerable debate, albeit often in the distinct contexts of war and national 
security.290  The question whether interbranch dynamics might generate 
frictions against a president’s antidemocratic policy agenda has not received the 
same level of attention.  But we think that a measure of skepticism about the 
effective force of such constraints is wise. 
There are two reasons for being cautious about the efficacy of Congress as 
a constraint.  First, James Madison’s account of the federal government’s 
threshold design famously identified the distinct institutional “ambition[s]” of 
each branch as the engines of constraint.291  But modern developments have 
“tied the power and political fortunes of government officials to issues and 
elections,” a dynamic that has fostered “a set of incentives that rendered 
these officials largely indifferent to the powers and interests of the branches 
per se.”292  Absent partisan division between the branches, Congress as 
currently constituted is as likely to enable as to restrain presidential 
agendas. 
Second, Congress’s formal authorities to seek information and to sue 
to enjoin ultra vires actions require a cameral majority.293  Unlike other 
democratic legislatures, the federal model lacks for mechanisms whereby 
  
289. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 42, at 31. 
290. The leading works on executive power in both military and nonmilitary contexts include 
Posner and Vermeule’s monograph, id., as well as STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. 
YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008), 
and Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996). 
291. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (advocating 
“giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and 
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others”). 
292. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 172, at 2323; accord Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and 
Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 670 
(2011) (“Madison never explained why the branches of government, or the state and 
federal governments, would reliably have political incentives at odds with one 
another . . . .”). 
293. See, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 81 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(holding that the House as an entity “has standing to pursue its allegations that the 
Secretaries of Health and Human Services and of the Treasury violated Article I, § 9, cl. 7 of 
the Constitution when they spent public monies that were not appropriated by the 
Congress”); Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 89–90 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(recognizing the House of Representative’s power to seek information from the executive 
under Article I). 
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minorities or opposition parties can contest executive action by hearings294 or 
by soliciting judicial intervention.295  The disabling of legislative minorities is 
exacerbated by an odd asymmetry in the Supreme Court’s separation of powers 
jurisprudence.  When supervising interactions between the branches, the Court 
has oscillated between a rigid formalism and a permissive functionalist 
approach.296  Whereas the Court has taken a latitudinarian approach to the 
delegation of regulatory authority to the executive,297 it has taken a 
pinched and prohibitory view of legislative efforts to counterbalance such 
delegations with a measure of post hoc oversight.298 
Perhaps the most important legislative constraint emerges across time.  
Statutes enacted under prior presidents impose positive obligations and 
negative prohibitions that may hinder antidemocratic agendas.  In the current 
configuration, therefore, it is not without irony (once more) that arguments for 
executive flexibility in construing statutes’ force blossomed in the context of a 
Democratic White House facing a recalcitrant Republican Congress,299 yet 
Republican arguments against implementation-related discretion have now 
withered.300 
In contrast to legislatures, federal courts as a whole are not formally 
aligned with discrete partisan formations, at least as a formal matter.  It may 
  
294. In the German Bundestag, sufficiently large minority parties receive a certain number of 
committee chairs.  In the British Parliament, there is an informal norm of granting losing 
political coalitions committee chair positions.  See Fontana, supra note 61, at 571–72. 
295. Id. at 580 (“Losing political coalitions are not only sometimes given, informally, 
the power to appoint judges, but also sometimes given special power to command 
the resources of a court by being given standing to bring lawsuits through 
generally applicable rules that permit losing groups to bring lawsuits.”).  A 
common configuration is to allow a legislative minority of between ten and twenty 
percent an opportunity to challenge legislation in the Constitutional Court.  See, e.g., 
CONSTITUTION FRANÇAISE Oct. 4, 1958, art. 61 (Fr.) (providing for any sixty Senators or 
Members of the National Assembly to challenge legislation before promulgation). 
296. See Huq & Michaels, supra note 216, at 357–80 (documenting oscillation across multiple 
doctrinal strands). 
297. Id. at 358–59 (summarizing doctrinal development). 
298. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto, a design 
choice that might be understood as a means of restoring congressional authority in an era of 
extensive delegation to agencies). 
299. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
265, 267 (2013) (describing and endorsing “the delegation . . . of the power to waive 
Congress’s rules”); Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548, 1552 
(2016) (making “a normative case for forbearance as a particular form of delegation”). 
300. For criticisms of Democratic presidents’ exercises of enforcement-based secretion 
based on statutory and constitutional grounds respectively, see, for example, Patricia L. 
Bellia, Faithful Execution and Enforcement Discretion, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1753, 1756–57 
(2016). 
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instead be more accurate to say that the judiciary tends to be aligned with one of 
several successive “constitutional regimes” that “organize all of a society’s 
fundamental political institutions,” and that tend to be inflected with (but not 
wholly arranged around) partisan priorities.301  Of course, over the medium 
term, a party with sustained control over the other two branches can 
reshape the judiciary in its image.  But if partisanship is less of a concern 
with respect to the judiciary in the short term, there is still no reason to expect 
that the American courts will be more akin to the pre-purge Polish judiciary in 
terms of working as a robust defender of democratic norms, rather than the 
subservient and enabling Weimar courts. 
The federal judiciary has secured over the twentieth century a large 
measure of administrative and operational autonomy.302  But its deployment of 
this discretionary autonomy has reflected above all its institutional interest 
in maximizing its jurisdiction over prestigious policy questions, while 
minimizing its obligation to engage in high-volume, retail vindication of 
individual constitutional rights.303  Institutional self-interest has catalyzed 
a network of constitutional common-law doctrines regulating the 
availability of remedies for constitutional harms.  These impose exceedingly 
burdensome requirements on complainants alleging past constitutional 
harms.  For instance, damages for constitutional torts are often unavailable 
when federal officials violate constitutional norms, given a plethora of 
doctrinal carve-outs.304  Even absent a carve-out, the threshold defense of 
qualified immunity means “all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law” need not face the cost of trial, let alone any 
  
301. Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court—Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the 
Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 34 (1999); see also Karen 
Orren & Stephen Skowronek, Regimes and Regime Building in American Government: A 
Review of Literature on the 1940s, 113 POL. SCI. Q. 689, 698–99 (1998) (defining the relevant 
conception of a regime and discussing its partisan construction). 
302. For synoptic historical accounts, see JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, 
AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2012), and Kevin T. McGuire, The 
Institutionalization of the U.S. Supreme Court, 12 POL. ANALYSIS 128 (2004). 
303. Huq, supra note 51, at 1–40. 
304. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (private corporate 
defendants); Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (national 
security and extraterritoriality), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2325 (2017); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 
701 F.3d 193, 199 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (denying remedies of U.S. citizen detained 
overseas without legal justification); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 394–96 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (denying remedies when national security at issue); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 
540, 547–52 (4th Cir. 2012) (denying remedies for allegedly unlawful detention and 
treatment). 
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penalty.305  Where anticipatory challenge is unavailable—for instance, 
because a policy is not clearly publicized in advance, or because Article III 
standing is lacking because the policy’s targets are ex ante uncertain306—
then judicial intervention on constitutional grounds will have only a weak 
deterrent effect.  And even where early judicial intervention is obtained, state 
actors have ample resources and opportunities to engage in foot-dragging, 
noncompliance, or obstruction.307 
Unlike the new constitutional courts of Eastern Europe celebrated by 
Issacharoff and other comparative constitutional scholars,308 therefore, the 
well-established federal judiciary lacks the institutional incentive to impede 
retrogression away from constitutional, democratic norms.  The language of 
deference to political branches exercises a powerful sway.  Much like the 
supinely partisan Congress, the path of institutional development observed 
over the twentieth century, coupled with now-entrenched doctrinal 
resistance to effective constitutional remedies, delimit and define its role.  The 
judiciary should not, then, be hailed as a substantial impediment to the 
prospect of constitutional retrogression. 
3. Centralizing and Politicizing Executive Power 
Comparative experience suggests that antidemocratic officials and 
coalitions view professionalized bureaucracies as impediments to their 
agendas.309  A parallel bureaucratic state has grown at the national level in 
the United States since the late 1800s.  A quasi-constitutional body of 
administrative law aligns legality with the application of expert knowledge.  
Recent constructions of Article II of the Constitution, however, undermine 
bureaucratic autonomy for the sake of democratic control.  To the extent these 
decisions facilitate antidemocratic mobilization, their legacy is precisely the 
inverse of their purported rationale. 
  
305. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986), quoted in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 
(2011). 
306. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 95–96 (1983) (denying standing in a suit for 
injunctive relief on this ground). 
307. This is true even in high-profile matters such as detention policy, see Huq, supra 
note 119, and school desegregation, see PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR 
CONVICTIONS 109–10 (1988), which states: “The Supreme Court’s refusal to set 
deadlines for desegregation invited Southern officials to invent foot-dragging tactics, 
and frustrated the NAACP lawyers who had struggled for years with cautious and 
often hostile federal judges, most of them closely tied to local power structures.” 
308. See ISSACHAROFF, supra note 204, at 200–02; accord Bugarič & Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 71. 
309. See supra text accompanying notes 227–232. 
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The starting point for legal analysis must be a gap, rather than a positive 
element of constitutional law: The U.S. Constitution lacks formal, textual 
protection of bureaucratic autonomy.  By contrast, many other constitutions 
provide for public service or civil service commissions to govern public 
employment and the operation of the bureaucracy, precisely because of the 
risk of partisan patronage.310  This is an accelerating trend today. But the 
drafters of our eighteenth-century document, working before the rise of the 
administrative state, could not have contemplated the need for constitutional 
regulation.311 
In the absence of constitutional protection, bureaucratic autonomy in the 
federal government takes root in Progressive Era statutes.  Reform was spurred 
in reaction to a Jacksonian “spoils system” in which presidents had a pivotal 
role in distributing government jobs as political favors.312  Starting with the 
Pendleton Act of 1883, Congress fashioned by increments a civil-service system 
designed to promote meritocratic government and professional governance.313  
Most recently, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 prohibited agencies from 
taking personnel actions that undermine an emphasis on merit and installed 
an independent agency, the Merit Systems Protection Board, to hear appeals 
of personnel actions.314  Since then, the Court has grafted a measure of First 
  
310. Some eighty-five constitutions of a historical sample of 822 have such commissions; 
of constitutions drafted after 1989, twenty-three of 215 have such commissions.  Data 
on file with authors, gathered from the Comparative Constitutions Project in January 
2017.  See generally COMP. CONSTS. PROJECT, supra note 141. 
311. See EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN 
STATE (2005). 
312. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1885 (2015) 
(“Under [the] ‘spoils system,’ control over government employment lay with the political 
party of the President.”). 
313. Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883).  These reforms continued 
in the Progressive Era.  ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 192–226 (2014) (describing Progressive Era 
reform movements).  The Pendleton Act, however, was initially of limited effect insofar as 
it vested civil servants with no protection from termination and did not mandate merit-
based exams.  See SKOWRONEK, supra note 54, at 64–80.  Civil service protections 
strengthened incrementally from the 1880s through the 1930s.  RONALD N. JOHNSON & 
GARY D. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY: 
THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 48–73 (1994). 
314. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1209, 2301–2305 (2012).  Non-discrimination clauses in departmental 
hiring policies often disallow discrimination based on political affiliation as well. 28 
C.F.R. § 42.1(a) (2017). 
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Amendment protection into the public employment context by prohibiting 
certain adverse employment decisions on the basis of party affiliation.315 
The strength of these protections and the success of the 
professionalization project, however, should not be overstated.  Even in 
highly salient domains such as monetary policy, political insulation from 
presidential control remains a function of conventions rather than written 
law.316  And, as Francis Fukuyama has noted, recent bureaucratic failures are 
strong evidence that “the US federal bureaucracy has fallen from the standard 
of a professional, impersonal, merit-based Weberian organization.”317  
Nevertheless, millions of federal employees in this system rely on these 
tenure protections, creating a formidable wall of potential resistance to 
quick changes in government programs. 
Jennifer Nou has suggested that the resulting federal bureaucracy may be a 
significant source of resistance to novel presidential initiatives.318  Bureaucrats, 
Nou explains, possess a range of tools, including: slowing down the 
implementation of programs; building an administrative record which compels 
particular outcomes; limiting the discretion of political appointees; 
manipulating information; leaking actions to the press; relying on inspectors 
general and other internal oversight bodies; and, in the extreme, seeking 
judicial recourse to avoid being compelled to violate the law.319  Nou further 
identifies recent precedent for bureaucratic resistance to attempted 
politicization.  When President George W. Bush’s administration sought to 
hire career staff on the basis of political affiliation, the Office of the Inspector 
General released a damning report, referring its findings to the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office.320  It found that an administration official had not only violated the 
  
315. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 74 (1990); see also O’Hare Truck Serv. Inc. v. 
City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 720 (1996) (extending the holding of Rutan to independent 
contractors). 
316. Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 
1167 (2013) (“The lens of convention . . . explains the disparity between the written 
law of independence and the operating rules of independence in the administrative 
state.”). 
317. Francis Fukuyama, Why We Need a New Pendleton Act, AM. INTEREST (Nov. 3, 2013, 5:00 
PM), http://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/11/03/why-we-need-a-new-pendleton-
act [https://perma.cc/5F7F-JFB9]. 
318. Jennifer Nou, Bureaucratic Resistance From Below, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. 
16, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/bureaucratic-resistance-from-below-by-jennifer-nou 
[https://perma.cc/2XXL-RW5L]. 
319. Id. 
320. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING AND OTHER IMPROPER 
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relevant rules but had given false testimony to the Judiciary Committee of the 
Senate.  While the U.S. Attorney declined to prosecute the official in question, 
legal rules provided appropriate protection as a consequence of the “distinctive 
law-internalizing practices” of lawyers within the executive branch.321 
The expertise enabled by civil service protection has its legal entailments.  
Agency actions receive judicial deference under the Chevron doctrine when 
they have emerged from certain relatively standardized and formal processes 
such as notice-and-comment rulemaking.322  Many commentators argue that 
the resulting Chevron deference reflects judicial reliance on intra-agency 
expertise.323  The failure to evince necessary expertise can result in a judicial halt 
(at least temporarily) of a policy initiative.324  To the extent that an 
antidemocratic leader has a policy agenda that entails regulation likely to 
confront judicial review for its rationality and legality, therefore, there is an 
incentive to preserve the expertise-related capacity of the federal bureaucracy. 
Notwithstanding these institutional predicates of bureaucratic 
autonomy, there are reasons why we should not be confident in the federal 
bureaucracy’s role in resisting constitutional retrogression.  First, as we have 
noted already, bureaucratic autonomy is not constitutional in nature.325  
Conventions are not “ironclad” and may be overcome in the face of 
  
PERSONNEL ACTIONS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION (2008), 
https://oig.justice.gov/special/ s0901/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4E2-WSFF]. 
321. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal 
Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1133 (2013); accord Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive 
(by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 827 (2012) (“[L]awyers trained in this [legal] 
tradition currently staff the length and breadth of the executive branch.”). 
322. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
323. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 1243, 1264 (1999); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative 
State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 596 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After 
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2084 (1990). 
324. For descriptive accounts of expertise-forcing judicial review, see Jody Freeman & 
Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 
51, 52, which identifies “expertise-forcing” Supreme Court cases that sought to combat 
“the politicization of expertise.”  Also see Aziz Z. Huq, The Institution Matching Canon, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. 417, 419 (2012), which argues that when a government actor makes 
a decision “that may impinge upon a liberty or equality interest . . . a court should 
determine whether the component of government that made the decision has actual 
competence in or responsibility for the policy justifications invoked to curtail the 
interest” and providing examples. 
325. One exception is the protection available under the Bill of Attainder Clause to 
bureaucrats who are targeted for hostile employment action by Congress.  See Lovett 
v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 142 (Ct. Cl. 1945), aff’d, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).  See 
generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
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“political contingencies,”326 with what we believe will be greater ease than 
formal constitutional rules enshrined in text or precedent.  Second, although 
the law provides potent resistance to attempts to politicize the bureaucracy, 
there are significant tools available to political appointees to undermine it.  
At the most basic level, presidential appointment of a head of agency openly 
opposed to its mission signals a prospect of significant barriers for staff who 
wish to actively advance that mission.  Staff cannot promulgate rules, conduct 
enforcement actions, or take any of the other routine steps without at least the 
acquiescence of the head of the agency.  Those who wish to advance an agenda, 
or have been working on solutions to regulatory problems for some time, may 
find themselves unable to take affirmative steps in the absence of a cooperative 
head.  In this fashion, an agency head opposed to an agency mission can 
preserve the status quo by resisting staff initiatives and derailing novel 
regulatory efforts. 
Third, and most strikingly, a convergence of liberal and conservative 
Justices have argued for and installed into doctrine more robust presidential 
control over both appointments and removals of officials from the federal 
bureaucracy.  In terms of appointments, a liberal coalition of Justices has 
recently vested the president with authority to make recess appointments even 
when the vacancy does not occur within a recess, and when an opportunity for 
an appointment occurs during a congressional session.327  A majority of 
conservative Justices, on the other hand, has reinvigorated the previously 
emasculated presidential claim under Article II of the Constitution to have 
exclusive authority to remove certain federal officials.328  The marginal effect 
on presidential control of either of these decisions is difficult to estimate 
with precision.329  Nevertheless, they exemplify a bipartisan drift toward 
greater presidential control over the bureaucracy that is at odds with the 
functional autonomy necessary for bureaucratic resistance to the 
antidemocratic project of constitutional retrogression. 
In summary, to the extent that bureaucratic autonomy is available as a 
brake on the gradual movement away from democratic practices, it rests on a 
  
326. Vermeule, supra note 316, at 1199. 
327. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2550 (2014).  In addition, the academic work of 
liberal justices evinces the same commitment.  See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001). 
328. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483–84 
(2010); see also Huq & Michaels, supra note 216, at 364–67 (describing pattern of 
removal-related cases in greater detail). 
329. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 24–52 (2013) 
(analyzing the uncertainty around the effect of Free Enterprise Fund). 
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statutory rather than a constitutional foundation.  Indeed, to the extent that the 
available constitutional doctrine bears on the matter, it supports rather than 
restrains presidents’ ability to set the bureaucracy aside. 
4. Shrinking the Public Sphere 
Democracy requires a shared epistemic foundation.  Where the state 
exercises either direct or indirect veto power over the voices aired in the public 
sphere or the factual material therein available, antidemocratic actors and 
coalitions face lower barriers to the consolidation of authority.  Analyzing the 
Constitution’s ability to impede the democratic deconsolidation along this 
margin therefore requires inquiry with respect to several distinct mechanisms 
whereby the public sphere can be corroded: Can the government use formal 
means, such as libel and registration laws, to sanction critics by law?  Are 
informal substitutes for formal prohibitions available?  Alternatively, can the 
government selectively titrate information in ways that systematically 
undermine public understanding of the consequences of electoral choices?  
And where allies of the antidemocratic regime pollute the informational 
marketplace with false information with the aim of discrediting political 
opponents, are remedial responses available? 
The U.S. Constitution performs well along some of these margins, but falls 
severely short in other respects.  Some pathways of democratic defenestration 
are shut.  Others remain invitingly open. 
To begin with, the Speech and Debate Clause330 enables legislators to 
protest executive branch policies and disclose waste and abuse without fear of 
retaliation, hence enhancing the quality of public debate.331  The Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment, as now interpreted, directly constrains the use 
of libel and associational regulation as overt instruments of viewpoint 
suppression.332  Doctrinal protection of speech acts, on the one hand, is at its 
  
330. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
331. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 24–25 (1998) 
(noting a connection between the Speech and Debate Clause and the First Amendment’s 
protection of freedom of speech). 
332. On libel, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–82 (1964), which held 
that to obtain a libel recovery, public officials and public figures must prove statements 
were false and made intentionally or with reckless disregard of their falsity, where the 
speech at issue dealt with a matter of public concern.  Also see Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974), which required falsity and negligence when the plaintiff 
was a private figure.  On associational freedoms, see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958), which invalidated a state court order to NAACP to 
produce membership lists. 
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acme when the speech “deals with matters of public concern . . . ‘relating to any 
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.’”333  On the other 
hand, as in many jurisprudential domains, associational claims tend toward 
fragility when the government invokes a national-security justification.334 
In other ways, the First Amendment is not quite the loyal amanuensis of 
the democratic will some have discerned.335  Nothing in the Constitution or 
federal law otherwise prevents high officials from launching personalized 
attacks on the honesty and integrity of otherwise respected news sources as a 
means of prophylactically disabling sources of future discrediting 
information.336  Or consider the possibility that either a regnant regime or its 
allies (whether domestic or international) strategically propagate false news 
stories about political opponents that are effective in defaming or discrediting 
them.  Relatedly, they can dilute the power of information by casting doubt on 
mainstream media sources.337 
A German legislator has recently mooted legislation that would require 
social media sites to remove fake news.338  Whether such a measure would be 
effective depends on technological and institutional conditions, and in 
particular, the availability of an independent arbiter resistant to state capture.339  
  
333. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 146 
(1983)). 
334. See, e.g., Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 
114–15 (1961) (upholding the Subversive Activities Control Act, which imposed 
registration and disclosure requirements on “subversive” organizations).  The modern 
iteration of SACB is the process of designating organizations as “foreign terrorist 
organizations,” which received the Court’s imprimatur in Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40 (2010). 
335. For a collection of sources, see Bhagwat, supra note 19, at 1103, which notes: “The sole 
purpose of protecting legislative speech is advancing democratic self-governance by 
protecting the elected legislature—the representatives of the people—from royal 
tyranny.” 
336. One of us has argued for a statutory remedy to be created in some such cases.  See Aziz Huq, 
When Government Defames, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/10/opinion/government-defamation-white-house-
slander.html?mcubz=3. 
337. See Jeremy W. Peters, Wielding Claims of ‘Fake News,’ Conservatives Take Aim at 
Mainstream Media, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/12/25/us/politics/fake-news-claims-conservatives-mainstream-media-.html. 
338. See Horand Knaup & Marcel Rosenbach, Fake News im Internet: Koalition Will Facebook 
Meldestelle Gesetzlich Vorschreiben [Fake News on the Internet: Coalition Wants to 
Mandate Facebook Reporting By Law], SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec. 16, 2016, 2:04 PM), 
http://www.spiegel.de/ netzwelt/netzpolitik/thomas-oppermann-plant-gesetz-gegen-fake-
news-a-1126182.html [https://perma.cc/B56S-9ZDR]. 
339. Indian courts regulate election speech for appeals to communal ethnic or religious violence 
that might spark violence.  See ISSACHAROFF, supra note 204, at 86–91.  These courts balance 
the right to freedom of expression against the government’s reserved constitutional power to 
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But the First Amendment likely forecloses any experimentation with such 
institutional possibilities.  In particular, consider the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in United States v. Alvarez,340 invalidating a conviction under the 
Stolen Valor Act for falsely claiming military honors.341  The plurality opinion 
in Alvarez is laced with bromidic nostrums to the effect that “[t]he remedy for 
speech that is false is speech that is true,” and that as a general matter 
“suppression of speech by the government can make exposure of falsity more 
difficult, not less so.”342  After Alvarez, “broad laws targeting false speech stand 
little chance of being upheld regardless of the topic.”343 
Further, the Constitution imposes little constraint on the selective 
disclosure (or nondisclosure) of information by the state in ways that can shunt 
public debate away from questions that would embarrass or undermine 
political leaders.  Proposals that the First Amendment be glossed to include a 
“right to know” rest in desuetude.344  At least three state constitutions, by 
contrast, contain rights to know.345  And some forty percent of national 
constitutions in force currently mandate access to government information.346  
  
protect domestic order—and they err on the side of caution to avoid speech that would 
incite violence.  Id. at 88.  There seems to be no categorical reason to think such speech 
regulation mechanisms will be distorted. 
340. 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
341. See id. at 729. 
342. Id. at 727 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (Brandies, J. concurring)). 
343. Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 74 MONT. L. 
REV. 53, 69 (2013); see also Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, 
and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1453 (2015) (“Both the plurality and 
concurring decisions share the view that punishing ‘falsity alone’ is not permissible; 
instead, the government may only regulate false speech when there is some ‘intent to 
injure,’ or more precisely, some intent to cause a ‘legally cognizable harm.’” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
344. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 449, 489–95 (1985) (arguing that the “right to know” is a logical extension of the right 
to free speech, protected by the First Amendment). 
345. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24 (designating all government records from all three branches of 
government as open, with two exceptions: the legislature, by a two-thirds vote and a stated 
justification, may make the information private, and the state constitution may already 
designate certain information as confidential); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9 (“No person shall 
be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the deliberations of all public 
bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivisions, except in cases in which the 
demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.”); N.H. CONST. 
pt. 1, art. 8 (“Government . . . should be open, accessible, accountable and responsive.  To 
that end, the public’s right of access to governmental proceedings and records shall 
not be unreasonably restricted.”). 
346. Data collected in January 2017 on file with authors. 
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In some countries, courts have created a constitutional “right to know” that 
provides a robust tool for policing information disclosure regimes.347 
In the United States however, transparency mandates are like civil service 
protections.  They are a fragile, nonconstitutional function of post-ratification 
reform efforts, this time dating from the 1940s and culminating in the Freedom 
of Information Act enacted in 1966.348  The Act provides robust support even 
now for investigative journalism.349  Of course, it is asymmetrical insofar as it 
does not preclude government from partial, misleading disclosures and leaks.350  
And in its enforcement, it has proved to be quite weak in the face of executive 
branch invocations of national security,351 a feature it shares in common with 
many other features of American law and government. 
Readily available state instrumentalities for antidemocratic epistemic 
degradation include: the manipulation of government secrecy classifications; 
erosions in the perceived or actual quality of government data; and outright 
manipulation.  There has been a secular increase in classification in recent years; a 
growing consensus insists that there is rampant overclassification and 
pseudoclassification.352  This has prompted various reactions, not least the 
passage of the Freedom of Information Act itself, but the problem persists.  
Because classification schemes are passed pursuant to Executive Order, there is 
  
347. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 11, 1969, Hei 21 (wa ワ) no. 11, 23 SAIKŌ 
SAIHANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1490 (Japan) (finding that the constitutional right to 
information includes a right to know).  This case is also known as “Kaneko v. Japan” or the 
“Hakata Station Film Case.” 
348. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).  For a discussion on the post-World War II political mobilization 
that culminated in the Freedom of Information Act, see MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE RISE OF 
THE RIGHT TO KNOW: POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF TRANSPARENCY, 1945–1975 at 28–63 
(2015). 
349. See JAMES T. HAMILTON, DEMOCRACY’S DETECTIVES: THE ECONOMICS OF INVESTIGATIVE 
JOURNALISM 160 (2016) (finding that forty percent of the stories that prompt policy reviews 
are based at least in part on documents obtained via records requests). 
350. On the use of leaks as instruments of policy, see David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: 
Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 531–32 (2013). 
351. See generally Susan Nevelow Mart et al., [Dis-]Informing the People’s Discretion: Judicial 
Deference Under the National Security Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act, 66 
ADMIN. L. REV. 725 (2014) (showing great judicial deference to executive branch 
invocation of Exemption One under the Freedom of Information Act). 
352. See Dubin v. United States, 363 F.2d 938, 942 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (defining over-classification 
as excessive classification pursuant to a classification scheme laid out by statute or 
Executive Order); see also Reducing Over-Classification Act, Pub. L. No. 111-258, 124 
Stat. 2648 (2010) (requiring the Department of Homeland Security to develop a 
strategy to prevent over-classification).  Pseudo-classification refers to schemes 
generated by agencies for dealing with sensitive information, even when not authorized 
to do so by statute. 
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ample room for government manipulation of the information environment.  
The President, at the extreme, could simply deem by fiat much of the 
information produced by government to be classified.  If accompanied by a 
compliant Congress, such a scheme could reduce the availability of even 
routine government data.  When accompanied by manipulation of the private 
news environment, the undermining of government data is a way of ensuring 
there is no authoritative and accurate source of information for the general 
public about questions of policy significance. 
Given this embarrassment of deceptive riches, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that presidents have on occasion sought to manipulate 
information produced by government agencies.  In one famous example in 
2003, the Bush White House reworked an EPA report to replace language 
about global warming with misleading information.353  We know very little 
about the extent to which such reworking or other forms of epistemic 
gerrymandering now occurs; in that particular case the facts only came out 
through government whistleblowing.354  In another instance, secret 
memoranda between the National Archives and Records Administration and 
the CIA led to reclassification of over 25,000 documents.355  There is no reason 
now to expect an antidemocratic movement to resist the allure of selective 
disclosure as an instrument of minimizing the risk of electoral loss. 
5. The Elimination of Political Competition 
The prospect of official proscriptions of either political parties or 
individual candidates of the kind observed in Russia seems outlandish in 
the American context.  We are skeptical that the forms of overt exclusion of 
political parties and candidates observed in other contexts of constitutional 
  
353. Too Many Secrets: Overclassification as a Barrier to Critical Information Sharing: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., Emerging Threats, and Int’l Relations of the H. Comm. 
on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 17 (2004) (statement of Rep. John F. Tierney, Member, H. 
Comm. Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., Emerging Threats, and Int’l Relations of the H. Comm. 
on Gov’t Reform). 
354. See Susan Nevelow Mart, Documents, Leaks and the Boundaries of Expression: Government 
Whistleblowing in an Over-Classified Age, DTTP, July 2007, at 30, reprinted in L. & TECH. 
RESOURCES LEGAL PROFS., https://www.llrx.com/2007/07/documents-leaks-and-the-
boundaries-of-expression-government-whistleblowing-in-an-over-classified-age 
[https://perma.cc/G4HM-LDUW]. 
355. Richard J. Cox, The National Archives Reclassification Scandal, RECORDS & INFO. MGMT. 
REP., Nov. 2006, at 1; see INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, AUDIT REPORT: WITHDRAWAL OF 
RECORDS FROM PUBLIC ACCESS AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
FOR CLASSIFICATION PURPOSES 6 (2006), http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2006-audit-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XBG-W5RG]. 
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retrogression would arise in the U.S. context.  But that is not to say that the 
Constitution cannot accommodate legal measures that would have the effect of 
stifling political competition.  To the contrary, the current election regulation 
landscape is quite propitious for the antidemocrat seeking instruments that 
secure constitutional retrogression by inches rather than miles. 
It is a truism among election-law scholars that “politicians, parties, and 
political coalitions have always sought to design or manipulate democratic 
institutions and electoral rules in such a way as to augment or entrench 
their hold on power.”356  Judicial scrutiny of the electoral thicket has not 
changed this dynamic, or blunted (much) the efficacy of political self-dealing.  
While federal courts occasionally intervene when faced with especially 
egregious forms of self-dealing through election law, especially when 
tainted by racial entanglements,357 in many instances they blink when 
confronted with anticompetitive, incumbency-enhancing effects.358  In some 
instances, the anticompetitive effects of election arrangements are even 
embraced as a positive good.  For example, the Court has endorsed the 
concentration of political authority in the two dominant political parties by 
permitting electoral regulations expressly aimed at ousting multiparty 
candidates, and thereby undermining third parties’ effective participation in 
the ballot.359  Compounding the weakness of judicial oversight, the United 
  
356. Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 
121–22 (2016); accord Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The 
Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 649, 668–69 (2002) (showing how incumbent control of redistricting can further a 
“state’s interest in accurate or proportional representation . . . reformulated as an 
interest in diversity”). 
357. See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(invalidating several provisions of North Carolina’s Session Law 2013–381 as racially 
discriminatory), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017). 
358. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 203 (2008) (plurality 
opinion).  For a useful list of franchise restrictions and their partisan consequences, see 
Stephanopoulos, supra note 32, at 324–30. 
359. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (upholding 
Minnesota’s antifusion law, which prohibited candidates from appearing on ballot as 
candidate of more than one political party); Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: 
Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and 
Republicans From Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 331–32 (reading 
Timmons as a constitutional endorsement of a party duopoly); see also Arkansas Educ. 
Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678–83 (1998) (upholding public 
broadcaster’s exclusion of third-party candidate from a debate among candidates 
for federal office).  There are other instances in which the Court rails against 
incumbency-protection measures.  See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
540 U.S. 93, 286 (2003) (Kennedy, J, concurring), overruled by Citizens United v. 
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States is one of a handful of countries to want for a professionalized 
election administration.360 
In this context of constant innovation in the manufacture of new forms 
of anticompetitive, exclusionary election devices—all falling short of 
proscription or overt violence—there is no shortage of ways in which 
constitutional retrogression might be pursued.  Gerrymandering, the 
manipulation of registration and voting times, ballot-access rules, and the 
regulation of party primaries—all of these are ripe with antidemocratic 
possibility.  By combining otherwise lawful measures, it is also possible that a 
substantial one-party “lockup”361 of the kind that exists in some U.S. states 
might be achieved at the national level. 
Even when a party loses elections, it can undermine its opponents.  
Consider an example from the state, rather than the federal government, 
context.  In a move eerily reminiscent of Hugo Chávez’s tactics,362 the North 
Carolina legislature recently sought to redefine the powers of the governorship 
after Democrat Roy Cooper won the election in a close vote.  The bill, currently 
enjoined, would remove the governor’s powers to appoint trustees of the state 
university, would eliminate eighty percent of the governor’s staff, and 
would require cabinet appointments to be approved by the state Senate.363  It 
would also revamp election administration and require that the supervisory 
body be evenly divided between Republicans and Democrats—but with 
Republicans holding the chair in even years, when all statewide elections are 
held.  At a very minimum, such retroactive manipulation of the powers of office 
implies a kind of constitutional bad faith, but as David Pozen has recently 
noted, there is no doctrine in American constitutional law that proscribes such 
partisan interpretation of the text.364 
  
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  How these various judicial 
pronouncements are reconciled (if at all) is unclear. 
360. See sources cited supra note 40. 
361. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the 
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 673–74 (1998). 
362. See supra text accompanying note 273. 
363. Cf. Richard Fausset, North Carolina Governor Signs Law Limiting Successor’s Power, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/us/pat-mccrory-roy-
cooper-north-carolina.html.  On the current state of the bill, see Nolan D. McCaskill, 
Court Blocks Law Limiting Democratic North Carolina Governor’s Powers, POLITICO 
(Feb. 8, 2017, 2:17 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/court-ruling-roy-
cooper-north-carolina-power-234802 [https://perma.cc/4LR6-ZLGY]. 
364. Cf. David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 907–08 (2016) 
(describing nonenforcement of good faith requirement in the separation-of-powers 
context). 
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Finally, should all of these measures fail, a political leader intent on 
derailing an election might instead seek to deploy the prosecutorial might of 
the U.S. government to taint or despoil another candidate’s reputation.  
Although U.S. Attorneys formally serve “at the pleasure” of the President,365 a 
historically strong informal convention precludes dismissal for reasons other 
than misconduct.  In December 2006, however, seven U.S. Attorneys were 
dismissed without obvious good cause.  Subsequent inquiries strongly 
suggested (without confirming) the seven had been singled out by staff in the 
White House for declining to pursue partisan agendas in their choice of 
indictments.366  
Whatever the facts of the 2006 events, it is quite possible to imagine today 
more politically motivated firings of federal prosecutors, followed by 
indictments targeting political opponents.  Evidence of partisan motives in the 
removal of prosecutors has proved very difficult to find given the difficulty of 
extracting information from the White House.  And evidence of improper 
motives in the context of individual prosecutions would be equally beyond 
reach given the Supreme Court’s refusal to allow discovery about improper 
prosecutorial motive except in exceptional cases.367  In sum, there is little 
beyond the thin tissue of convention to prevent the tremendous powers of the 
federal prosecutorial apparatus to be swung against selective political 
contestants on partisan grounds. 
6. Federalism 
The United States has one institutional characteristic that is sometimes 
thought to be a distinctive safeguard against centralizing tyranny: the 
constitutional diffusion of governmental authority between the national 
government and the several states, or federalism.368  Federalism is both 
  
365. John McKay, Train Wreck at the Justice Department: An Eyewitness Account, 31 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 265, 265–66 (2008). 
366. See id. at 275–76 (describing evidence of improper partisan motive and focus on voter 
fraud cases). 
367. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 459, 470 (1996) (limiting discovery of 
improper prosecutorial motive); see also Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 490–91 (1999) (holding the same in immigration context). 
368. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 544 
(1954) (“[F]ederalism must appear to many peoples as the sole alternative to 
tyranny . . . .”). 
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anointed as democracy’s savior,369 and also condemned as a handmaiden of 
local tyrannies.370  The North Carolina election law, for example, provides some 
cause for the latter concern.371 
The existence of subnational entities wielding substantial regulatory 
authority and possessing considerable regulatory capacity means that states 
and certain localities will almost certainly play a necessary role in any process of 
constitutional retrogression—or in the narrative of a failed attempt at such 
backsliding—at least in terms of the negotiations they force from the federal 
government.372  But we think it is uncertain ex ante how federalism (or 
localism) will influence the trajectory of retrogression.  It is possible that states 
will serve as salutary platforms for alternative, antiauthoritarian politicians and 
coalitions in the manner that Heather Gerken has suggested.373  For many 
policy areas, states and cities have the power to slow implementation and even 
nullify federal law.374 
Alternatively, it is also possible that a concatenation of state electoral results 
and policy actions in the voting rights domain in particular will entrench an 
antidemocratic coalition, and render it nationally unassailable.  Patterns of 
diffusion, whereby policies and institutions adopted in one state can spread to 
others, need not differentiate between pro and antidemocratic content.  One can 
imagine institutional innovations such as those adopted in North Carolina 
spreading around the country, creating a series of one-party states.  If a sufficient 
number of states fall into that category, national electoral competition would be 
severely limited. 
  
369. See Jeffrey Rosen, Opinion, States’ Rights for the Left, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/opinion/sunday/states-rights-for-the-left.html 
(describing federalism as a progressive tool). 
370. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, From States’ Rights Blues to Blue States’ Rights: Federalism 
After the Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 800–01 (2006) (“States’ rights have 
been associated historically with [causes to oppress individual rights].”). 
371. See supra text accompanying notes 362–363. 
372. For an account of such negotiation, see Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural 
Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1635 (2014), which explores state/federal 
negotiations wherein the state uses the bargaining chip provided by state sovereign 
immunity doctrine. 
373. Heather Gerken, We’re About to See States’ Rights Used Defensively Against Trump, 
VOX (Dec. 12, 2016, 2:14 PM), http://www.vox.com/the-big-
idea/2016/12/12/13915990/federalism-trump-progressive-uncooperative 
[https://perma.cc/AN5S-5NSF] (describing federalism as a source of “progressive 
resistance”). 
374. See KYLE SCOTT, FEDERALISM: A NORMATIVE THEORY AND ITS POLITICAL RELEVANCE 94–
115 (2011) (discussing the phenomenon of nullification). 
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It is not, in short, that federalism is irrelevant.  Far from it.  It is rather that 
before the fact it is very hard to know whether devolution will accelerate or 
retard the advent of an authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian regime at the 
national level.  As in so many other areas, the Constitution provides less certain 
protection than one might have expected. 
7. Conclusion 
Contrary to what one might assume given the robust celebration of the 
U.S. Constitution, that document and its common-law glosses have an 
ambiguous and uncertain relationship to the risk of constitutional 
retrogression.  Many of the key features of constitutional doctrine are not found 
in the text, which is replete with gaps and ambiguities.  This invites selective 
formalist reinterpretation of the Constitution to advance particular partisan 
goals.  Constitutional rights, usually thought to provide the paradigm set of 
protections from tyrannical rule, work only at the margin, and are dependent 
on courts asserting their institutional heft in variable ways across American 
history.  And structural protections, such as federalism or bureaucratic 
autonomy, may not be robust in the face of steps taken to undermine them. 
*  *  * 
To reiterate, our claim is not that observation of only one of these 
mechanisms amounts to constitutional retrogression.  Our definition demands 
substantial backsliding in the quality of electoral competition, rights, and the 
rule of law simultaneously.  Some degree of institutional calcification, partisan 
entrenchment and manipulation, and exclusionary public-sphere 
management are likely discernable in most democracies.  But it is a mistake to 
reason that just because some slippage from an (unrealizable) ideal of 
democratic governance under the rule of law is inevitable, that any amount of 
slippage is conceptually homologous, or normatively untroubling.  
Sometimes, a large number of even small quantitative differences add up to 
qualitative change. 
IV. IS AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY EXCEPTIONAL? 
A survey of comparative experience, set against the legal and 
institutional resources of U.S. constitutional law, suggests that the latter 
provides a tolerably good safeguard against authoritarian reversion but not 
constitutional retrogression.  This Part takes up the contemporary 
implications of this analysis.  We ask first whether recent events indicate a 
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substantial risk of retrogression.  Second, we consider what might be done if 
that risk exists. 
A. Evaluating the Risks 
We have defined constitutional retrogression as a substantial negative 
movement that happens simultaneously across three margins: electoral 
competition, rights of speech and association, and the rule of law.  To ask 
whether there is a risk of such retrogression today is not to idealize 
contemporary or recent American democracy.  We recognize, of course, that 
this has been no golden age.  The quality of our constitutional democracy has 
risen and fallen across time.  Broadly speaking, however, the trend over the 
course of the twentieth century has been toward expansion of the franchise, the 
deepening of the constitutional rights required for the effective exercise of 
political choice, and the institutionalization of the rule of law in the 
administrative state, along with the expansion of judicial power.  Yet, just as 
some have recently speculated the long era of American growth has run its 
course, it is possible that we have reached not just the limit of available marginal 
improvements in democratic quality, but an inflection point at which 
movement shifts in the other direction.375 
How grave is the worry now?  Consider the current array of warning 
signs.  For the first time, for example, one of the two major party candidates 
attacked a sitting federal judge’s integrity on the basis of his national origin; 
refused to disclose tax documents showing his financial interests and potential 
conflicts of interest; threatened to prosecute and imprison his opponent; and 
explicitly refused to accept a loss of the popular vote at the polls.376  His 
campaign staff harassed and threatened press perceived as hostile; some 
journalists received a barrage of violent threats from the candidate’s 
supporters.377  And once that candidate prevailed at the polls, he continued to 
  
375. See generally Gordon, supra note 11 (documenting the end of the high-growth era for 
United States). 
376. See Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, Is Donald Trump a Threat to Democracy?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/opinion/sunday/is-donald-trump-a-
threat-to-democracy.html. 
377. See Erik Wemple, Opinion, Megyn Kelly’s Personal Horror Stories, Starring Donald 
Trump and Roger Ailes, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/megyn-kelly-divulges-her-own-private-
horrors-of-donald-trump/2016/11/11/01f2da30-a82f-11e6-8042-
f4d111c862d1_story.html?utm_term=.27f348778af2 [https://perma.cc/6REH-7JSG]. 
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complain of (nonexistent) voter fraud against him.378  Against the backdrop of a 
surge in abuse, vandalism, and violence targeting racial and ethnic minorities, 
as well as gay and transgender individuals, his surrogates warned they would 
investigate social movements committed to advancing the interests of ethnic 
and religious minorities, and his allies in the House of Representatives have 
started to install measures that could radically undercut bureaucratic 
autonomy.379 
We think these indicia of hostility to the institutional predicates of 
democracy are sufficient to raise the specter of retrogression.  What would this 
look like in operation?  We do not see constitutional amendment to formally 
entrench retrogressive policies as likely.  But a president with authoritarian 
impulses, acting with an acquiescent Congress, could easily disable other 
branches’ institutional checks.  A new president with an aligned Congress is 
unlikely to face inquiries or demands for information.  Federal courts, to the 
extent they are not indifferent to that president’s agenda, may lack incentives or 
confidence to intervene in any but incremental ways.  We are also less sanguine 
than others about the possibility of bureaucratic resistance posing a sustained 
form of drag, especially given that many of the existing civil service protections 
are merely statutory or customary in nature.  It is not inconceivable that an 
authoritarian administration might go substantially further than earlier ones 
in aggressively politicizing the prosecutorial arm of the Department of Justice 
and the Internal Revenue Service in ways that compromise effective 
democratic competition.  Threats and intimidation against journalists seeking 
to follow basic canons of journalistic ethics, as well as aggressive efforts at 
misinformation by the White House on matters of national concern, 
would constitute further evidence of retrogression.  The resurgence of 
hate speech targeting dissenting voices and minorities, or proposals to single 
out such people for coercive or intrusive government action, also contract 
the public sphere (and are objectionable on their own terms).  Finally, 
retrogression would be quite plain if administrative, prosecutorial, or 
  
378. Michael Shear & Peter Baker, After His Claim of Voter Fraud, Trump Vows “Major 
Investigation”, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/01/25/us/politics/trump-voting-fraud-false-claim-investigation.html?mcubz=3&_r=0. 
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epistemic capacities of the federal government were turned against a 
White House’s political competitors, supplementing existing efforts to 
rewrite the rules of partisan competition in ways that undermine prior 
norms of reciprocity.380 
Given the absence of strong institutional safeguards against retrogression, 
much depends on the idiosyncratic disposition and intentions of a particular 
president and her political coalition.  Accordingly, our analysis points toward a 
need to pay close attention to the specific winning candidate in presidential 
elections, their incentives, and their beliefs.  In this regard, we note that some 
have called President Trump’s approach to governance “aconstitutional.”381  
Others have said that he “either disdains the principles enshrined in the United 
States Constitution or pretends the document does not exist altogether.”382  If 
proved true in practice, these would be grounds for grave concern. 
In summary, we think these various steps, in the aggregate, do suggest that 
there is a present danger of constitutional retrogression.  The quality of 
democratic contestation has already suffered; while liberal rights that are 
central to democratic practice have survived, they operate in a public sphere 
that is under threat.  And the institutions of the rule of law, while holding for 
the moment, are vulnerable to politicization much as they have been elsewhere.  
A handful of judicial appointments, combined with an aggressive uptick in the 
activity levels of the Supreme Court, could produce a judiciary that is decidedly 
part of the governing coalition, rather than a check upon it.  Should the rule of 
law begin to be undermined, the risk will materialize.  Democratic elections will 
continue in the United States, but they may be serving a constitutional liberal 
democracy that is qualitatively weakened.  And this, in turn, has important 
consequences for American soft power and the global pursuit of the national 
interest. 
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B. Navigating Constitutional Retrogression 
If our analysis is correct, what is to be done?  A central problem is that 
many of the institutional choices that create vulnerabilities to constitutional 
retrogression in the United States are longstanding.  They are baked into the 
constitutional design at the outset of our nation’s history or fashioned by a 
Court that was focused on different political realities.  Had other choices been 
made then, the risk of retrogression today might be different.  But should the 
risks inherent in our particular constitutional design materialize, attempts at 
institutional recalibration will be too late, as proposals will likely not be 
incentive-compatible with the interests of national leaders who are already well 
lodged in place. 
Perhaps the most useful implication, therefore, concerns attitudes rather 
than institutions.  Posner and Vermeule have argued that the American people 
are excessively fearful of “tyranny,” and the present Article might be read as an 
exercise in tyrannophobia.383  They argue that presidents will not abuse their 
authority because of a concern to maintain their credibility through costly 
signaling of their sound motives.384  Our analysis points in a different direction.  
It suggests that the constitutional and legal safeguards of democracy are, in 
fact, exceedingly thin, and would prove to be fairly easy to manipulate in the 
face of a truly antidemocratic leader.  Strategies that have availed 
antidemocratic leaders in other nations are readily at hand here, but 
countervailing checks are not in place.  Credibility, which is emphasized by 
Posner and Vermeule as a safeguard against abusive action, provides only a 
weak restraint given a sufficiently weak public sphere, sufficient partisan 
venality, or a reasonable modicum of presidential sang froid about the 
weakness of forthcoming democratic contests.  Popular mobilization against 
even incremental evidence of retrogression, on the other hand, is hindered by 
the fact that there will never be a singular moment when the United States tips 
over from robust democracy into a quasi-authoritarian state. 
Institutional pluralism, we think, has an important role to play.  The 
United States still has a vigorous press, as well as a judiciary that generally 
seems inclined to stand up to direct attacks upon the press.  The more 
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immediate threat to a robust public sphere based on a shared epistemic ground 
is the delegitimation and marginalization of news sources that attempt to hew 
to norms of empirical verification and nonpartisanship.385  The willingness of 
socioeconomic elites to demand high-quality news, and to decry exogenous 
efforts to distort the informational environment either by official or unofficial 
means, will be of much importance. 
The United States has two political parties that (by and large) remain 
committed to democratic politics, rather than to the securing of permanent, 
entrenched governmental power.  But there is no guarantee that either party 
will remain committed to the democratic game.  The decisions of party leaders 
and activists on both sides to prioritize the continuance of democracy as an 
ongoing concern, and their willingness to allow transient policy triumphs to 
offset concerns about antidemocratic behavior, will be of dispositive 
importance.  When partisan agendas overwhelm commitment to the 
institutional predicates of democratic competition—where, in effect, one party 
becomes an antisystem formation—retrogression becomes substantially more 
likely.  This suggests that to the extent the new president presents a threat of 
retrogression, the pivotal choices will not be taken by his opponents—but 
rather by his putative partisan allies. 
Under what circumstances do political actors maintain fidelity to 
democratic politics, rather than seek to try to entrench themselves into 
permanent power?  Norms of reciprocity are likely to do some work, but 
their persistence must also be explained.  One story is that the political actors 
fear that they will be punished should they violate the constitutional norms of 
democracy.  Arguments of this kind about the robustness of constitutional 
protections ultimately fall back upon claims about the people themselves.386  
Constitutions are, after all, just pieces of paper that take their force from the 
intersubjective understandings of elites and citizens.  It is this quality that 
leads us to suggest that the current moment may be a dangerous one, and to 
identify public support for the norms and conventions of democratic politics 
as the critical factor.  Whether this is a cause for optimism is a matter of 
legitimate debate.  Constitutional veneration may trend high in the United 
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States,387 but popular constitutional knowledge remains exceedingly poor.  In a 
recent poll, for example, only a quarter of Americans could name all three 
branches of government; a third could name none at all.388 
Even if popular knowledge of the Constitution were more robust, 
constitutional enforcement requires the kind of intersubjective agreement 
on violations that is difficult to obtain, especially under mutative and 
precarious political conditions.  Given the availability of piecemeal, 
incrementalist pathways to weakened democratic structures, the public will 
lack for obvious threshold moments or focal points around which to 
mobilize.  This absence of legal safeguards, coupled with the difficulty of pro-
democracy mobilization, suggests that seemingly excessive concern about 
retrogression away from democratic practices may well be quite sensible at 
the current moment.  To the extent it persuades, moreover, such public 
concern may be the only effective friction on an antidemocratic agenda. 
At the same time, it is important not to be overly pessimistic.  Shifts in 
the quality of constitutional liberal democracy are not unidirectional or 
permanent.  The history of post-reconstruction “Redemption” in the South, 
an earlier instance of retrogression, shows that what falls can also rise.  But 
the mobilization required to effectuate reversals in the direction of change is 
costly, and especially challenging in an era of epistemic fractionalization.  It 
is as easy today to imagine sustained retrogression as it is a more contested 
period of give and take. 
CONCLUSION 
The threat to constitutional liberal democracy in the U.S. context is real 
but not well understood.  Scholarship in law and politics has focused on threats 
from the military or emergency powers and the possibility of autocratic 
reversions.  We have argued that this focus is misplaced.  There is a low risk, in 
our view, of either military coup or the institutionalization of permanent 
emergency rule, at least assuming a strategic would-be authoritarian.  The 
threat of constitutional retrogression is more substantial, we think, and more 
insidious.  Perhaps the most important immediate contribution in this Article 
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has been to isolate and define this threat, and to describe its mechanisms.  This 
cartographic exercise provides clarity, we hope, on the nature of the current 
shadow over democracy. 
But we are under no illusion that such a mapping exercise itself provides a 
remedy.  The coming years, we predict, will be ones of stress and turmoil for 
American liberal democracy.  Retrogressive tactics, once attempted, are apt to 
be reused by different, ideologically varied candidates and elected officials.  
Whether democracy as a systemic quality survives depends less on the 
robustness of our formal, institutional defenses—which, we conclude, are not 
particularly strong—and more on the decisions of discrete political elites, and 
the contingent and elusive dynamics of popular and elite mobilization for and 
against the conventions and norms that render democratic life feasible. 
All this makes the case for American exceptionalism especially shaky.  
Even as they drew on Enlightenment ideals in their formation of the 
Constitution, the Founders believed that time would inevitably bring 
corruption and decay.  While they hoped that decay could be postponed 
through careful institutional design, they also knew that the handiwork of 
the Constitution would be imperfect, and subject to significant pressures.  
They viewed the United States as a great experiment, but one also subject 
to the universal laws of history, which included the inevitable decline of 
republics.  They surely would have been skeptical of subsequent claims of 
American exceptionalism.  Today, surveying the risk of retrogression, we 
think they would see no cause to revise any of these views.  Nor would they 
abandon their trepidation about the ideal of a democratic future.  We 
should follow their lead. 
